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Pakistan and Turkey are located in natural disaster-prone regions. The frequency of 
occurrence is high with varying magnitudes. These natural disasters often lead to a 
multitude of losses. The overall impact of natural disasters on these countries is 
significant, and for specific disaster-hit areas, it becomes enormous. The Van earthquake 
in Turkey in 2011 and the floods of Pakistan in 2010 are two exemplary cases, showing 
all the catastrophic effects of a large-scale natural disaster. Systems are in place for 
disaster management at the national level both in Turkey and Pakistan; however, the 
response often falls short in terms of speed and quality, thereby failing to provide 
requisite immediate relief to those affected. To some extent, the response strategies in the 
Van earthquake and floods in Pakistan could not meet the ideal emergency response 
criteria for the national management of these particular disasters. 
The purpose of this project is to study the efficacy of natural disaster management 
systems in Pakistan and Turkey in the cases of the Pakistan floods and Van earthquake. 
We take the relatively mature and developed system followed in the U.S. during and after 
Hurricane Irene as a baseline for the assessments and comparisons. Results and 
comparisons will help identify the shortcomings in natural disaster-management systems 
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Throughout history, people have been striving to understand the reasons for and 
to mitigate the impacts of natural disasters. Due to their unpredictability, natural disasters 
have affected the lives of humans significantly. Since it is still a very difficult task to 
predict nature and estimate the location as well as the magnitude of natural disasters, 
societies attempt to aggregate their efforts to lessen the initial impact and post-disaster 
needs. Even though the approaches or methodology differ from one to another, all 
societies have the same goals to address disaster management. 
Disaster management concepts show variances in the execution phase. This 
differentiation results from several factors such as political, cultural, economic, or 
capacity of available resources, as well as the efficacy of the organizational structure that 
is responsible for the disaster-management process. All these factors are highly correlated 
to the success and efficacy of the disaster-management process. 
Despite modern information technology and sophisticated planning processes, 
still no nation is capable of manipulating the causes of natural disasters, nor is any nation 
fully immune from disasters’ devastating impacts. The capabilities of nations are very 
limited when attempting to prevent the occurrence of natural disasters. To maximize the 
utilization of tools and resources that nations have, disaster management focuses on 
effective planning and strategy, both of which start in the rational decision-making 
process of a well-established and mature disaster management organization. A cohesive 
organizational structure is vital for effective disaster management, because it is a bridge 
between the plans and documentation done in the preparation phase, and the response 
executed just after the incident. Any kind of possible discrepancy or inadequacy is the 
direct manifestation of a weak organizational process. In that sense, this research aims to 
study disaster-management systems of three different countries and their efficacy during 
particular cases in order for authors to reach a conclusion and related recommendations 
regarding the needs for improvement, adjustment, and adaptation. Figure 1 shows the 
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four axes of disaster management cycle composed of prevention, mitigation, response, 
and recovery. The study mainly focuses of the response phase that is determined by the 
interaction among the other three axes. 
 
Figure 1.  Phases of Disaster Management (from Vanneuville et al. 2011)  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this project is to study the efficacy of natural disaster management 
systems in the U.S., Pakistan, and Turkey, with special emphasis on lead disaster-
management agencies at the national level. This research will also analyze the structural 
aspects and processes being followed to make recommendations for improving existing 
natural disaster-management systems. Results and comparisons will help identify the 
shortcomings in natural disaster-management systems of Pakistan, Turkey, and the U.S., 
and will provide insight for a better optimized, and more effective, disaster-management 
system. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To conduct this study, we will answer the following research questions: 
• How have natural disaster management organizations evolved in the U.S., 
Turkey, and Pakistan; and what are the similarities between respective 
strategies/procedures for immediate response to major natural disasters? 
• How was the immediate response to a major natural disaster of Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Prime Ministry Disaster and 
Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), and National Disaster 
Management Authority (NDMA) in the U.S., Turkey, and Pakistan, 
respectively? 
• What are the strengths and weakness of FEMA, AFAD, and NDMA in 
providing immediate disaster management response? 
• Are there any measures required for improvement of immediate natural 
disaster-management response by FEMA, AFAD, and NDMA? 
D. OBJECTIVE 
This study focuses on the efficacy of natural disaster-management systems of the 
U.S., Pakistan, and Turkey during specific disasters. Granted that there are many aspects 
of the natural disaster-management process; however, this research intends to limit its 
analyses to the organizational development and evolution of the natural disaster-
management systems of the U.S., Turkey, and Pakistan. 
1. Scope 
The research carries out the analyses to identify the similarities and differences 
between respective strategies/procedures during relief operations in general, as well as 
during specific cases. It will focus on optimizing the organizational effectiveness of the 
U.S., Turkey, and Pakistan in specific cases by detecting the structural strengths and 
weaknesses of their disaster-management systems. 
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2. Benefits of the Study 
The primary benefit of this study is to focus on the difficulty of maintaining the 
match and harmony between disaster-management strategies and plans, as well as the 
response during the incident. It is reasonable to assume that strategies and plans 
oftentimes seem sufficient if the analytic reasoning and fit between strategies and plans 
are sustained. However, the execution of these pre-disaster prepared documents generally 
shows some degree of variation from the expected outcomes. Moreover, these variations 
might occur due to many factors that are not always significantly correlated to each other. 
This research will focus on the organizational factors that can dramatically affect the 
outcomes of a natural disaster, as well as the success of relief operations executed during 
the response phase. 
The secondary benefit is our analysis highlights the importance of a 
comprehensive disaster-management structure that meets the requirements of different 
kinds of natural disasters, rather than specializing uniquely on particular types. Actually, 
this requirement is the corollary of the unpredictability of natural disaster, in that all 
countries should be prepared and capable of managing the urgent needs of the response 
phase that takes place just after the disaster. This research studies three major natural 
disaster types in three different countries in three different time frames and environments. 
The results of this analysis are the strongest advocates of the primary benefits of this 
research, which intends to optimize the problematic areas of the sample countries’ 
disaster-management systems. 
E. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
This research is composed of four main chapters. In the literature review chapter 
(Chapter II), the research provides background information about the definitions, causes 
and effects of natural disasters, and presents the evolution of the disaster-management 
concept in the world. Moreover, the literature review clarifies the evolution of natural the 
disaster-management structure of the U.S., Turkey, and Pakistan in the light of official 
sources and academic articles. 
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In this chapter, the research discusses disaster-management process and its 
functioning during Hurricane Irene, the floods of 2010, and the Van Earthquake, which 
occurred in the U.S., Pakistan, and Turkey, respectively. In addition, the research aims to 
focus on the organizational structure of disaster-management systems, national disaster-
management strategies, and plans of these countries in light of the practices and activities 
demonstrated during the specific cases. 
In the analysis chapter (Chapter III), we focus on the evolution of the disaster-
management systems profiled in the three countries. This is followed by an analysis of 
the differences in structures and resultant effects on their operations. Finally, we see the 
problems related to the conduct of disaster management during specific cases to identify 
possible causes. 
In Chapter IV, we restate the results of Chapter III, and identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of current organizational structures of disaster-management systems. This 
chapter includes analyses of the response of these structures to specific natural disasters. 
Chapter V follows with recommendations for improving the effectiveness of disaster-
management systems of the analyzed countries, and Chapter VI offers conclusions and 
considerations for nations worldwide. 
 6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
The research on natural disasters has a very broad spectrum that ranges from 
technical and engineering issues to social and organizational perspectives that are mostly 
related to administrative performance of the state institutions and particular 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Likewise, there are various literatures intended 
for explaining these different dimensions of the issue. Bearing the same intentions, in this 
chapter we will review the general definitions, causes, and effects of natural disasters. 
Subsequently, we will examine the evolutionary development of natural disaster 
management organizations of the U.S., Turkey, and Pakistan in order to ripen the study 
for Chapter III, where we will discuss the efficacy of these countries’ organizations in 
specific cases.   
1. Causes and Effects of Natural Disasters 
Natural disasters stem from nature-based destructive events that give damage to 
people and economies. However, there is an insignificant correlation between the cause 
of the extreme events and outcomes of the disasters. In other words, the causal 
relationship between extreme and high stake events and the destructive outcomes of 
natural disasters do not have a strong correlation factor. That is why scientists assert that 
disasters might also result from minor natural events, and sequences of subsequent 
events, which often intersect with the human factor as a catalyst (Dovers and Handmer 
2007). The human factor constitutes one of the most crucial co-factors of natural 
disasters. For example, settlements in hazardous areas, the incremental increase in 
contamination and pollution, construction of unsafe structures in flood-prone areas, 
adverse effects of income gap and poverty, poor education, and insufficient information 
technology are among these factors. It is important to highlight the implicit point that 
these factors are actually the historical roots of all major catastrophic disasters in the 
world. Another important point is the variety and complexity of the intermingled factors 
stated here. These nonlinear factors require a complex and strong cooperation of different 
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sciences such as sociology, communication, logistics, politics, strategic management, and 
organizational behavior. These sciences attempt to uncover underlying causes of inherent 
vulnerability of disasters in addition to the efforts for better and optimal solutions for 
prevention and response. 
Another factor that makes the cause and effect relationship unpredictable is the 
ambiguity and inconsistency of the disasters themselves. Sometimes it can be easy to 
observe the causes of disasters, as it was in the Chelyabinsk area of Russia (Monroe 
1992). However, in contrast to the human-caused disasters, the nature-based disasters are 
hard to recognize and define before they occur. For example, scientists are still debating 
the reasons for Hurricane Katrina. While some of them claim that climate change, 
contamination, ozone depletion, and biodiversity loss are major factors, others believe 
that the real causes for the hurricane are not obvious, despite the strong claims about 
climate change (Steffen et.all 2004). 
The most common belief about the causes of disasters is the increasing number of 
climate extremes resulting from the climate change. Definitely, this is a major factor, but 
not a single factor. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 
(IPCC) Special Report on Extremes and Managing Disasters (United Nations 2012), the 
factors can be classified as follows:1 
• Hazard: This term stands for the increasing frequency of climatic extremes 
around the globe. IPCC claims that the major factor for the hazards result 
from global warming (United Nations 2007). The melting down of the 
glaciers and the increasing average heat of seasons cause warmer winters, 
fewer frosts, and changed rainfall patterns, which together damage 
biodiversity. This claim has many proponents in academic and public 
opinion. However, there are also strong arguments stating that global 
warming is a naturally occurring cycle, and its long-term benefits will be 
much more significant than its short- or long-term ones or its costs; in that, 
the drought areas in the world will affect agriculture due to the increased 
sea level (Mendelsohn, Nordhaus and Shaw 1994). Moreover, they state 
the catastrophic outcomes of global warming will never be experienced 
because of the balancing natural movements and cycles in the atmosphere 
and tectonic crust of the world (Van der Ploeg and Withagen 2012). 
                                                
1 The terms used here might seem a replica of definitions. However, the causal relationship between 
the terms and natural disasters is the main point that the authors want to state in this part. See “Definitions” 
section which follows this part for universal meanings of the terms. 
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• Exposure: This term refers to the increasing population, especially in the 
poorer areas. The income gap and differences in standards of living have 
become wider. Despite this, the relationship between income and 
population is negatively correlated, that is, the richer the country, the 
slower its increase in population. For this reason, those most affected by 
natural disasters are disproportionately poor people who generally live in 
previously vacant areas (previously left vacant because of the risk of 
flood, landslides, earthquake zones, and industrial pollution) (Dovers and 
Handmer 2012). 
• Vulnerabilities: 
• Urbanization: Large cities have turned into mega-cities by virtue of 
industry and business amenities in these areas; however, these 
urbanized locations have actually transformed into a convergence 
center for masses of people and their never-ending activities. Thus, 
overloaded transportation systems, overused resources of the cities, 
and accumulated waste of humans and their activities precipitate 
the emergence of disasters. This situation is often explained as 
environmental degradation (Stiglitz 2003). 
• Socioeconomic Factors: As stated in the previous paragraphs, the 
increasing abyss among the wealth of people and countries results 
in the imbalanced use of natural resources. This factor, in fact, can 
be more pertinent to the causes of human-related disasters rather 
than natural disasters (Evans and Ashley 2004) because natural 
disasters are more unpredictable and mostly follow similar 
historical patterns, which have weak correlation with the industrial 
development cycle of the world. 
• Wars and Civil Strife: These factors mostly stand for the 
destructive effects of natural disaster rather than the causes. These 
factors cause the mass mobilization and displacement of people. 
These masses generally concentrate in specific areas that are called 
refugee zones or districts. Due to the lack of transportation and 
proper infrastructure in these areas, the effects of potential natural 
disasters are often dramatic in these areas. The unstable social and 
political situation, the ongoing military interventions, and use of 
destructive weapons hinder the efforts of both official agencies and 
NGOs (Levy and Sidel 1997). In short, in case of a natural disaster 
these people are left to their own destiny due to the impossibilities 




The following terms, all of which will be used throughout the study, are the 
universal definitions for the disaster management domain. 
Hazard 
Hazard is defined by events or physical conditions that have the potential for 
causing injuries, fatalities, property and/or infrastructure damage, agricultural and/or 
industrial damage, harm to daily business life, damage to environment, and other types of 
harm and loss (FEMA 1997). Moreover, this study will refer to natural hazards, even 
though there are two more major types of hazards, such as technological hazards and 
intentional hazards (Akdag 2002). 
Risk 
Risk is used to symbolize the likelihood of an unwanted possibility; that is why 
this study will refer to risk as the destructive damage of a natural disaster. It is reasonable 
to think of hazard as a dependent value of risk and vulnerability, which are independent 
variables to determine whether a hazard is a result of a disaster. In addition to defining 
the outcomes as consequences, the probability of a disaster occurring can be defined as 
likelihood. Thus, risk can be stated as the product of consequence and likelihood (RISK = 
LIKELIHOOD x CONSEQUENCE) (Ansell and Wharton 1992). 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability represents the inclination of an object, individual, group, area, 
community, and country to incur the consequences of a hazard (Coppola 2006). 
Implementing strong policies that consider the requirements of an effective disaster-
management strategy can mitigate these deficiencies. Since the consequences of a 
disaster might vary due to its co-factors, the vulnerability also differs from one location 
to another, as well as from one country to another. Therefore, in order for international 
efforts to yield effective and standard outcomes in disaster-management response, the 
agenda setting and policy-making phases should be accurately designated, which will 
minimize the margin of error in the variations of vulnerability in all cases for all countries 
(Kaya and Sahin 2013). 
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Disaster 
Disaster is the realization of the risk factor of the hazard. In other words, each 
event has some potential of damage, and damage varies by magnitude of hazard that has 
the risk of resulting in a disaster. As stated earlier, the risk is the probability of an 
unwanted event that can also be called hazard. Here emerges the critical point that not 
every event means disaster; rather, only the ones that overwhelm the response capacity 
and affect the vulnerability of a country are considered disasters. To put it simply, the UN 
defines a disaster as “a serious disruption of functioning of a society, causing widespread 
human, material, or environmental losses, which exceed the ability of the affected society 
to cope using only its own resources” (UNDHA 1992). 
Safe 
Safe stands for the threshold that can bear the devastative effects of the risk up to 
some point. Since completely risk-free environments cannot exist in the real world, 
assigning a safety point and designing a management system whose reliability matches 
with that safety point will help countries use their available resources with maximum 
efficiency. Derby and Keeney (1981) emphasize that a safety level is only admissible if it 
associates with the best of available alternatives, not with the best of the alternatives that 
one would hope to have (Kadioglu 2011). 
Combined Disaster 
Compound disaster stands for the snowball effect of hazardous events which 
holds true for most natural disasters. Namely, one primary disaster might cause a 
secondary hazard, or a prior low-hazardous event might cause a subsequent devastating 
disaster. The readiness level of the disaster management plans should encompass these 
uncertainties that can exponentially aggravate the outcomes of disaster cases (Coppola 
2006). 
Humanitarian Crisis 
Humanitarian crisis is the situation that stems from the combination of destruction 
after a disaster and the failure or insufficiency of a current disaster-management system 
in the affected location. The outcome often results in the form of starvation, disease, 
insecurity, exposure, and incremental growth in the number of victims (Coppola 2006). 
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Refugees and Internally Displaced People 
When one is forced to leave his country due to wars or internal strife, then this 
person is referred to as forced migrant. The distinction between a refugee and an 
internally displaced person comes up here. The first one represents a person who is able 
to leave his country during the turmoil, while the latter describes one who is unable or 
unwilling to leave his country. The prior one has many protections and subsidies from the 
international arena, as well as the host country, while the second one has very little 
physical protection and is often faced with food, water, and provisions shortages 
(Goodwin and McAdam 1996). 
3. History of Major Disasters in Turkey, Pakistan, and the U.S. 
All three countries have experienced natural disasters of various magnitudes and 
impact levels throughout their history. Some of these disasters caused significant damage 
and destruction. This section summarizes the most notable ones regarding these three 
countries. 
a. Turkey 
From an historical standpoint, Turkey has had many disasters, some of which 
included major destructive consequences for the country. Beginning with the Turkish 
Republic in 1923, Turkey experienced one of its greatest catastrophes—the Erzincan 
Earthquake in1939—which resulted in over 30,000 deaths and more than 100,000 heavily 
damaged or destroyed buildings. Soon after this disaster, the Turkish government took 
some serious actions such as tax cancellations and compensation payments for those 
affected. But the most important regulation made by the government was to set quality 
standards for construction materials.  
In the early 1940s, Turkey struggled with many concurrent floods in different 
regions. Countless agricultural lands and grazing fields were ruined due to the landslides 
and avalanches caused by deluges. These put heavy burdens on the economy that was 
already hurt by WWII. Between 1945 and 1999, Turkey experienced many minor disaster 
events that did not affect the social and economic life as much. 
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The Marmara Earthquakes in 1999 were the most destructive disasters in 
Turkey’s history. The main reason for the catastrophic outcomes was that the affected 
areas were critical locations of business and social life with large populations and heavy 
industry. This disaster was the milestone in Turkish history that focused on the 
modernization of the disaster-management domain (AFAD 2013a). 
In 2011, the Van Earthquake, while not as destructive as previous ones, had a 
different status in the disaster-management experience of Turkey. It was the first disaster 
to hit Turkey after the implementation of a new disaster-management system, which was 
expected to work flawlessly after the lessons learned from the Marmara Earthquake. This 
earthquake was also important because it assessed the performance of AFAD, and 
measured the accuracy of its predictions and preparations for the pre- and post-disaster 
phases. With regard to the losses, the Van Earthquake resulted in 604 deaths and 4,152 
injuries. At least 11,232 buildings sustained damage in the region, 6,017 of which were 
found to be uninhabitable. In other words, at least around 60,000 people were left 
homeless (Hacaloglu 2011). 
b. Pakistan 
Pakistan has also experienced a variety of natural disasters. This vulnerability 
originates from its geography. It is a country with diverse topography and climatic 
conditions. The country is situated on the Indo-Australian plate, is continuously moving 
northward and sub-ducting under the Eurasian plate, thus triggering earthquakes. Fifty-six 
percent of the Indus basin lies in Pakistan, including five major rivers. This basin and its 
rivers command approximately 70 percent of the country. The South Asian monsoons 
regularly cause overflow of the rivers, resulting in floods in large parts of the country. About 
60 percent of the total area receives an annual rainfall of less than 200 millimeters, and is 
classified as arid. Less than average rains in these areas result in drought conditions. Coastal 
belts of the country are also vulnerable to cyclones and tsunamis. Some of the natural 
disasters that have struck the country in past are listed in this section (GFDRR 2009). 
In 1935, a 7.7 Richter scale earthquake hit the city of Quetta, the capital of the 
western province of Baluchistan, and virtually leveled the city. Approximately 60,000 
 14 
people were killed in the disaster. In 1945, another earthquake of a 7.8 Richter scale 
magnitude hit the coastal region of the same province, causing a 40-foot Tsunami, inflicting 
4,000 deaths and a huge loss of property. In 1950, monsoon rains caused severe floods, 
affecting the provinces of Punjab and Sind, killing 2,900 people, rendering 900,000 
homeless, and leveling over 100,000 homes. In November 1970, a high-intensity tropical 
cyclone hit the eastern part of the country (now Bangladesh); this was one of the worst 
natural disasters in modern times. Storm surges flooded large parts of the territory, and 
approximately 500,000 people lost their lives. In 1974, a 6.2 Richter scale earthquake hit 
Kohistan and adjacent areas in the mountainous northern part of the country. It was reported 
that 5,300 people were killed, 17,000 injured, and 97.000 were affected. A cyclone in 1999 
in the coastal districts of the Sind province wiped out 73 settlements, killed 168 people in 
Thatta and Badin, and killed 11,000 cattle. Nearly 0.6 million people were affected by the 
cyclone. In 2000, a nearly yearlong drought in the arid Baluchistan province caused 100 
deaths and affected over one million people. In 2005, an earthquake of 7.6 Richter scale 
magnitude caused devastation in Kashmir and the Khyber Pakhtoon Khawa (KPK) 
province. At least 73,000 people were killed, and more than 3300,000 were rendered 
homeless (UNOCHA 2010). 
c. The U.S. 
The history of the U.S. is also abundant with various types of natural disasters, 
including tornados, tsunamis, floods, and hurricanes. Since it has a huge surface area, the 
country is exposed to almost annually occurring natural disaster events that can be 
classified as major type disasters. In the last decade, the U.S. has experienced 14 
catastrophic natural disasters, all of which resulted in human loss and significant property 
and infrastructure damage. From researching disaster history, it is predicted that these 
annual disasters will continue to occur in the future. To this point, the measures and 
projects held by FEMA gain importance in order to decrease vulnerability and increase 
the efficacy of the reaction period during the event. 
Beginning in the twentieth century, the San Francisco Earthquake in 1906 was the 
worst disaster in terms of human lives lost. In this disaster, about 3,000 people died, and 
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over 80 percent of San Francisco was destroyed when the earthquake was compounded 
with the fires generated by the disaster’s shock waves (The Virtual Museum of the City 
of San Francisco, n.d.). 
In 1980, a heat wave in the U.S. resulted in at least 1,700 deaths and about $20 
billion of agricultural damage to the affected areas (NOAA, n.d.). Hurricane Andrew in 
1992, the Northridge Earthquake in 1994, and the Oklahoma tornado outbreak in 1999, 
are other destructive events that occurred in the last century. 
In the twenty-first century, Hurricane Charley, Hurricane Frances, and Hurricane 
Ivan all hit in 2004, causing more than 150 deaths and about $45 billion of damage 
(Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, n.d.; NHC, n.d.) The most 
destructive disaster in this century was Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which resulted in 
1,836 deaths and about $84 billion to the U.S. economy (NOAA 2011a). The Mississippi 
River floods in 2011, the April 25‒28 tornado in 2011, the Joplin tornado in 2011, and 
finally Hurricane Sandy in 2012 were some other major and large-scale catastrophic 
events that have occurred in the current century. 
4. Effects of Natural Disasters on Turkey and Pakistan 
a. Turkey 
As stated earlier, Turkey is a country highly vulnerable to natural disasters, 
especially earthquakes. Many people and assets have been lost in these catastrophic 
events. The most significant reality about the effects of disasters is that the post-disaster 
damage is usually higher in underdeveloped or developing countries due to the lack of 
transportation logistics, infrastructural developments, and organizational strategy and 
vision. Often the affected country wrestles with the outcome of the disasters as well as 
the preparations necessary during the pre-disaster phase. To justify this claim with 
examples, the death toll in the 1999 Marmara Earthquake in Turkey was much higher 
when it was compared to even higher magnitude earthquakes in Los Angeles in 1994, and 
Kobe, Japan in 1995. The results in Turkey were worse than the other two because the 
construction concrete and pre-disaster preparation, in addition to the ineffective 
 16 
organizational strategy, aggravated the consequences of the disaster (Akturk and Albeni 
2002). 
Another effect on Turkey was the new stand-by treaty with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) resulting from the unexpected costs of disasters. In other words, 
the lack of a disaster emergency funding pool compelled Turkey to apply for 
international aid and funds that affected the regular loan payments to the lenders; 
especially the World Bank and IMF. The great financial depressions in 2000 and 2001 
can be manifested as a corollary of the Marmara Earthquake in 1999 (World Bank 1999). 
Finally, these events always cause socio-psychological effects on the society. The 
imminent loss of lives, accommodations, and sudden disruption of daily life cycle create 
significant problems and stress for people, which should be handled by specialists and 
experts in this field. Since Turkey did not have this knowledge and scientific background, 
past natural disasters affected the people very deeply by disorganizing their dynamics of 
personal and social identities. In 2011, during the Van Earthquake in Turkey, many 
researchers reported that those affected in the area showed psycho-social disruptions, in 
addition to permanent cognitive apprehensions and fears regarding their future 
expectations from life (Yilmaz and Isitan 2012). 
b. Pakistan 
Pakistan is a developing country with a population of approximately 190 million. 
General conditions include a largely poor population dependent upon agriculture and 
farming. The majority of the population is living in rural areas with poor quality housing, 
meager allocations for disaster mitigation, and ineffective disaster-management systems. 
All these factors exacerbate the effects of natural disasters when they strike. During the 
past, natural disasters have resulted in huge losses in terms of life and economy. Disasters 
have a huge impact on development in the country in general, and the affected areas, in 
particular. Each new disaster not only compels a diversion of scarce resources toward 
relief efforts, but also has a negative effect on progress already made. In the case of some 
major disasters, decades of achievements were wiped out in moments, with affected areas 
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and communities being pushed back for decades. Table 1 summarizes the losses inflicted 
by natural disasters in Pakistan (EM-DAT 2013). 
Table 1.   Natural Disaster-Related Losses in Pakistan 
Category of 
Disaster 
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shaking) 25 143016 6588582 5229755 
  Average  per event   5720.6 263543.3 209190.2 
Flood Unspecified 24 4372 20671883 1170030 
  Average  per event   182.2 861328.5 48751.3 
  Flash flood 14 3006 22097725 10073118 
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  Average  per event   26.3 
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  Local storm 9 180 1385 - 
  Average  per event   20 
153.
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  Tropical cyclone 7 11555 
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B. EVOLUTION OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
Disasters have adversely affected mankind since the beginning of human life on 
Earth. Accordingly, humans are looking for ways and means to protect themselves from 
the consequences of the disasters. The approach and methods for disaster management in 
the past depended upon the resources and progress made by a particular society. 
1. Historical Perspective 
Disasters have been such an important part of history that at times they actually 
steered and shaped it. Entire civilizations have been wiped out instantaneously. As 
Coppola states “theorists have even ventured to suggest that many of history’s great 
civilizations including the Mayans, the Norse, the Minoans, and the Old Egyptian 
Empire, were ultimately brought to their knees not by their enemies, but from the effect 
of floods, famines, earthquakes, tsunamis, El Nino events, and other widespread 
disasters” (Coppola 2006). Past generations were also aware of various hazards. They 
resorted to actions and measures that helped reduce and/or mitigate the adverse effects of 
the disasters. Several historical records form different periods indicate an analytical 
approach and organized measures to deal with the disasters. 
Noah’s Ark: The story of Noah’s Ark as mentioned in two religious books (i.e., 
Old Testament and Quran) provides details of how Noah dealt with the great floods. It 
includes insight regarding important disaster-management concepts being practiced 
today, such as warning, preparation, and mitigation. The story begins when Noah 
receives a warning regarding an upcoming flood of great magnitude. His family and 
followers set out to prepare a large ark to survive the flood period. They store large 
quantities of supplies on the ark, and place in the ark a pair of all species of animals on 
Earth. Finally, the flood comes and submerges the land. Noah and his companions board 
the ark and remain until the water recedes. Those who did not heed the warning and 
prepare for the disaster perished. 
The Asipu: Asipu was a social group that lived in Iraq around 3200 BC. They 
performed the tasks of risk management and decision analysis for the community. When 
faced with a difficult situation, especially danger and risk, the community turned toward 
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the Asipu for guidance. Using techniques similar to present day hazard risk management, 
the Asipu would analyze the problem, come up with possible alternatives, and develop a 
response to each alternative (Vincent and Manpower 1985). 
Herculaneum and Pompeii: The towns of Herculaneum and Pompeii faced grave 
threats when the volcano Vesuvius erupted in 79 AD. The city of Herculaneum was at the 
base of the volcano and in the path of lava flow and was, therefore, buried under the 
molten lava when the volcanic eruption took place. The people of Pompeii had some 
warning before the lava reached their town. City leaders utilized this time to evacuate the 
city, which resulted in the majority of residents escaping the threat. Some of the people 
who refused to leave the city were buried under ashes, like the residents of Herculaneum. 
This incident indicated existence of organized disaster-management response in that era 
(Coppola 2006). 
2. Modern Roots of Disaster Management 
Disaster-management approaches that address potential hazards threatening a 
community or country are a new concept. However, by glancing backward, we can 
identify disaster-management programs aimed at addressing a particular hazard. There 
existed highly effective programs, not only in mitigating relevant threat, but also in 
producing positive effects in the environment. Following are some of the examples. 
Flood Fighting: Human settlements have always thrived along the rivers and 
waterways. However, when these water courses swelled, they also posed great dangers to 
those living close by. Early civilizations were aware of the problem and attempted to 
address the issue. One of the renowned examples is of ancient Egypt under Amenembhet 
III (1817–1722 BC). Using a system consisting large water wheels numbering over 200, 
Amenembhet III developed a river control project. This system diverted the Nile 
floodwater to Lake Moeris, not only mitigating the threat of flood, but also helping to 
reclaim 153,000 acres of fertile land (ESIS, n.d.). 
Firefighting: The history of organized firefighting dates back 2000 years, when 
the city of Rome was nearly destroyed by a fire. After this great fire, Emperor Augustus 
assigned the task of firefighting to a unit of the Roman Army. New systems ensured an 
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organized and effective mechanism of firefighting, a task previously performed by slaves 
that lacked training, equipment, and motivation. With a new organization, firefighting 
became a respectable job. The organizational structure was followed by the Roman 
Empire for 500 years, and some of the structures of those firefighting units are still being 
used in many firefighting departments today (Coppola 2006). 
Food Shortages: Famine and starvation were regular features in British India 
during the nineteenth century. The problem was so severe that there were up to 1 million 
starvation-related deaths each year. A governmental study revealed that sufficient food 
existed throughout the subcontinent to feed its entire population. The root cause of the 
problem was poor distribution systems that hindered the availability of sufficient stocks 
at required places. To overcome the problem, the government introduced a mechanism 
that revolved around identification of indicators for emerging needs, monitoring of public 
health, and an extensive railway system across the breadth and length of the country to 
enable quick transportation of grain. This system proved very effective, and is still being 
followed in certain ways (Coppola 2006). 
3. Birth of Contemporary Emergency Management 
Contemporary emergency management systems have their roots in the “Civil 
Defense Era.” In the middle of the twentieth century, realizing the threats of air raids and 
potential nuclear strikes, industrialized nations embarked upon an elaborate civil defense 
system. The system included an early warning mechanism, protective housing, and search 
and rescue organizations to handle post-strike situations. Individual countries introduced 
proper legislation to guide the organization and functioning, as well as regular funding of 
respective civil defense organizations. These legislative works formed the basis of the 
modern emergency-management organization in most of the countries. For example, the 
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 is the foundational document for the United States 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. In some of the developing countries, disaster-
management systems were drastically restructured as a consequence of the apparent 
inability to handle a major disaster in the country, as was the case of the National 
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Disaster Management Agency in Pakistan that was developed after the devastating 
earthquake of 2005. 
a. Disaster Management Cycle 
Disaster-management cycle is comprised of several phases that can be related to a 
disaster and mitigation effort. Descriptions of these phases can be traced back as far as 
1930 (Neal 1997); however, these were more focused on understanding the disaster, as 
well as relief-focused response. This approach started to change in the 1970s, with the 
realization that relief-oriented disaster management may not be the most judicious 
method of mitigating the disaster. To accommodate the shift in traditional thinking within 
the field of disaster management, ‘new mechanisms’ were needed to drive the 
management of disaster situations. One of these was the disaster-management cycle that 
was designed to illustrate the ongoing process by which governments, businesses, and 
civil society planned for, and reduced, the impact of disasters, planned response during 
and immediately following a disaster, and took steps to recover after a disaster had 
occurred (Coetzee and Niekerk 2010). A disaster-management cycle proposed in 1975 
comprised six different phases, including: reconstruction; mitigation and prediction; 
preparedness for relief; and warning, relief; and rehabilitation (Baird et al. 1975). 
Thereafter, many variations and deviations have been made in the structure of the 
disaster-management cycle and its application. Disaster-management cycles proposed by 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1992 were comprised of five 
phases (UNDRO 1991). In 2002, disaster-management scholar and author David 
Alexander proposed another cycle comprised of four distinct phases including: 
mitigation; preparation; response; and recovery as shown in Figure 2 (Alexander 2002). 
This model is being widely used by various organizations; however, there have been 
several other models that organize the cycle into overarching phases relative to the 
disaster (i.e., pre-disaster and post-disaster) (Holloway 2012; Khan and Khan 2008). 
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There are four main axes in the disaster-management cycle: 
1. Mitigation: This phase consists of activities that encompass the risk 
estimations and evaluations that will reduce and eliminate the loss of life 
and property. 
2. Preparedness: This phase deals with the preparation and training for 
disaster management operations. Moreover, this phase maintains the 
required coordination with the people and institutions for a better 
preparation. 
3. Response: This phase demonstrates accuracy of all the preparations and 
plans that are done in the prior phases. 
4. Recovery: This phase has the activities that deal with the healing and 
normalizing of life systems in the disaster-affected areas. 
 
Figure 2.  The Disaster Management Cycle (from Alexander 2002) 
b. Disaster Management – Organizational Structures 
Comprehensive emergency management, as well as the organizational structures 
linked to it, is a relatively new concept. Originally, the job of dealing with the 
emergencies was left to the local governments and the communities. In most cases, due to 
a shortage of resources and capacity, the local response was mostly directed at providing 
post-disaster rescue and relief. Preparation efforts in this regard would be restricted to 
capacity building, including purchasing equipment and training as previously deemed 
necessary for handling disasters faced by the community. Similarly, at the higher levels 
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of government, disaster-management efforts were mostly directed toward extending 
financial, material, and manpower support to the affected communities on a required 
basis. The most noticeable effect of this practice was that local communities were never 
adequately prepared to deal with a major disaster when it struck. 
A change in said framework occurred in the post-World War II era, but it was not 
directly related to natural disaster management. Realizing the catastrophic results of a 
possible nuclear strike from an adversary, several countries, such as the U.S., the UK, and 
other developed countries in that era, established national civil protection agencies to 
help the local communities prepare for such contingencies. These agencies guided the 
local and regional governments in building community shelters, enhancing public 
awareness, and preparing medical and other response teams. These national civil 
protection agencies are seen as the root of many of the present day emergency-
management organizations. Transformation of the civil protection agencies towards the 
emergency management role is linked with the decline in threat of nuclear strikes as well 
as realization regarding increased human and financial costs of natural disasters. 
Recognizing the need, many nations, including those mentioned earlier, began legislation 
to expand the role of national civil protection agencies in dealing with all hazards 
(Coppola 2006). 
Situations in developing countries did not improve, either due to a lack of 
resources or other limitations, and emergency management remained restricted to 
localized and post-disaster efforts. During the 1994 World Conference on Natural 
Disaster Reduction, developing countries that lacked an organized disaster management 
capacity, committed to develop required structures. In pursuance of the Yokohama 
Strategy and a Plan for Action for a Safer World, most nations took steps to establish a 
dedicated national agency to deal with natural hazards (Coppola 2006). 
When looking at the contours of organizational structures of disaster-management 
systems, they are mostly linked to the system of government being followed in a 
particular country. However, an ideal system seeks an elementary disaster-response 
mechanism at a local level, which is supplemented by a national agency to make it more 
comprehensive and potent. With the passage of time, the expertise and skills are built at a 
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national level, and are transferred to local levels depending upon availability of resources. 
Various frameworks that are being used to support emergency management in today’s 
world are: 
1. Locally Based Structures: Locally based emergency-management 
structures include the fire department, police department, emergency 
management service, and office of emergency management. Their 
effectiveness is linked to the fact that community members know the 
needs of the community, and are the ones with a maximum stake in 
effective emergency management. They can be most effective in 
mitigation and preparedness which greatly depend upon local knowledge, 
local input and buy in, and dedication for effective implementation. When 
the magnitude of disaster grows beyond the capacity of local response 
agencies, regional and/or national agencies are also brought into action 
with necessary manpower, technical and financial resources to assist. 
However, even in such situations disaster management is best executed 
when done under the leadership of the local executive. Countries with 
well-developed local emergency management systems (regardless of the 
existence of a regional or national disaster management system) include 
the U.S., the UK, Brazil, and New Zealand (Coppola 2006). 
2. Regionally Based Structures: While local governments govern smaller 
geographical areas, there could be regional governments present in a 
country having command over larger areas comprising a number of 
localities. In the case of a federal system of government, regional or state 
governments have broad powers to make laws, generate and spend 
resources, as well as guide the functioning of local governments. In such 
systems, regional government retains the authoritative base of emergency 
management. In many countries, first response agencies including police 
and fire departments are funded and dispatched from the regional level 
with local officials having very little control over the actions of emergency 
management agencies. On the other hand, in many countries, even those 
with a locally controlled emergency management base, regional 
emergency management agencies exist. They focus on policy setting, 
direction and governance, funding and capacity building for local 
agencies. When both local and regional agencies exist together, the latter 
may be called upon when the former is overwhelmed by the magnitude of 
disaster and may either assist or take on coordination responsibility to 
manage resources coming from outside the concerned jurisdiction 
(Coppola 2006). 
3. Nationally Based Structures: Almost all countries have established a 
national disaster-management agency, partly due to UN recommendations. 
The scope and effectiveness of these agencies vary according to their 
position within national government, size, funding, and training. National 
emergency-management agencies are most suited in supporting roles, 
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leaving actual decision making to regional and local emergency 
management agencies. Lack of sufficient resources to meet the specific 
needs of all communities as well as distance from actual stakeholders 
undermine their effectiveness in different phases of disaster management 
including preparation, mitigation, and response. Nevertheless, national 
agencies have important functions including (Coppola 2006): 
• Formulate national emergency-management policies and plans 
• Organize training for regional and local emergency managers and 
workers 
• Provide funding for regional and local agencies 
• Provide technical assistance and specialized resources 
• Coordination and facilitation of foreign assistance 
 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN 
THE U.S., TURKEY, AND PAKISTAN 
As discussed earlier, current hazard- and disaster-management organizations have 
evolved from similar origins, but in different circumstances and timeframes. Civil 
defense systems can be identified as the basic structure as the predecessor of the 
incumbent national disaster management organizations being considered here. 
1. U.S. 
The federal government’s involvement in natural disaster dates back to 1803, 
when a congressional act was passed to provide financial assistance to a fire devastated 
town in New Hampshire (Elsevier, n.d.). Similarly, fire disasters, a significant hazard for 
cities in the nineteenth century, often lead to more ad-hoc legislation by Congress, aimed 
at reducing financial hardship of affected communities (FEMA 2010). Authorizing the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Bureau of Public Roads to make disaster loans 
available for reconstruction of public facilities destroyed by disasters, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and Flood Control Act of 1934 assigned greater flood control 
responsibilities to the Army Corps of Engineers. Consequently, major steps were taken in 
the first half of twentieth century in the context of disaster management. The 1950s 
marked creation of the Federal Civil Defense Administration focused on protection 
against nuclear attacks, and the Office of Defense Mobilization, with “emergency 
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preparedness” as one of its functions. The two were merged into the Office of Civil and 
Defense Mobilization under the Department of Defense. It pointed towards changes in 
the federal government’s financial assistance based disaster assistance approach 
(Elsevier, n.d.). In the next decade, several significant disasters struck, and in response, 
fresh legislations were designed and new setups created to assist those affected. This 
included the National Flood Insurance Act, offering federally guaranteed flood insurance 
to homeowners, and creation of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration under 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to extend housing and other 
forms of aid to survivors. The federal government’s disaster relief role was 
significantly extended with the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 to include federal loans 
and tax assistance, federal funding for repair and replacement of public facilities, and 
authorization of funds for mitigation of potential impacts of disaster threats. It also 
engaged a partnership between federal, state, and local governments in disaster 
response (FEMA 2010). 
These steps enhanced the federal government’s role in emergency 
management; however, the path through which these steps were taken resulted in a 
large number of federal departments responsible for their specific task. The absence 
of a single central authority resulted in coordination problems. Working with more 
than 100 federal departments and agencies, and a corresponding number of state and 
local governments, complicated the preparedness and disaster response that led the 
National Governors Association in 1979 to urge national leadership to centralize the 
federal emergency management function. As a result, the federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) was created through a presidential executive order 
during that same year, consolidating many separate disaster-related functions, and 
bringing responsible agencies at the federal level under its umbrella (FEMA 2010). 
During coming years much energy went into realigning and consolidating of 
diverse policies, programs, and objectives that came along with FEMA’s component 
agencies. It was with this effort that the Agency developed an Integrated Emergency 
Management System, adopted an All Hazards Approach, and developed a positive 
relationship with state and local governments and the communities. The last major 
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organizational change in the disaster-management structure was affected when in the 
post-9/11 era FEMA was switched from the purview of the White House to the 
newly created Department of Homeland Security (Elsevier, n.d.). 
2. Turkey 
Before the Turkish Republic era, examples of the first regulations in natural 
disaster management go back to a royal decree by the Ottoman Sultan Beyazıt II 
following the Istanbul Earthquake of September 14, 1509. This earthquake resulted in 
over 13,000 deaths and destruction of 109 mosques and 1,047 buildings. In addition, 
another important document was introduced that corresponded to the Regulation of 
Building (by the Ebniye Nizamnamesi) issued in 1848, as a result of the need to introduce 
rules for urbanization and housing. 
During the Turkish Republic period, the natural disaster system was exposed to 
some important changes and adaptations, as a result of the Erzincan Earthquake in 1939, 
and the Marmara Earthquake in 1999. The most significant modification in the natural 
disasters-management system was put into effect in 2009, when the system structure and 
organizational networking were redesigned and adapted to the modern world’s 
requirements. Due to this, it would be more accurate to classify the development phase as 
the pre- and post-2009 periods. 
a. Legislative Development 
Legislation is a government’s response to the changing conditions in processes 
and policies affecting the daily life and necessities of the people. The most formal and 
official ways to modernize the disaster-management systems are governmental 
legislation. Policy development is critical to Turkey due to its various natural disasters. 
As mentioned in an earlier section, Turkey is geographically vulnerable to earthquakes, 
so the disaster or crisis management terms are generally used for the response to tectonic 
events. However, due to the changing atmospheric conditions and some other human-
made factors, Turkey has started to experience other kinds of natural disasters, such as 
floods and landslides. Thus, the legislation history of Turkey shows the variation and 
adaptation due to the recently emerging events and necessities (Ganapati 2008). 
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Pre-1944 Period: This era was actually the nascent stage of the disaster-
management system formulation, so due to the lack of expertise and technology, this era 
only became actively effective after disaster occurred. This period is generally referred to 
as the post-event response period by researchers. Since this period was devoid of 
effective and systematic crisis management policies and activities, the response phase of 
disaster-management cycle was comprised of only two axes out of four. These response 
and recovery phases were in contrast to the preparedness and mitigation phases (Ganapati 
2008). Due to the necessity for lessening the effects of disasters, the government enacted 
a Mitigation Law (No. 4373) in early 1943 (Corbacioglu and Kapcu 2005). 
The1944–1955 Period: Because of the devastating earthquakes in this period, the 
government felt the need to consider the disaster-management issue more seriously. Since 
this period was abundant with much entrenched legislation, it can be called the ‘feeble 
countermeasures’ period. In this period, the hardest task for the government was to 
sustain a resilient mitigation and preparedness plan for disaster response. As a result, the 
government started to enact a cascade of proactive laws. 
The 1955–1998 Period: This period is the first step in transition to a more 
complex and comprehensive structure in disaster management. For that reason, this 
period is called the ‘ministry response for disaster and construction’ period. This period is 
also important because the first means of other types of disasters were considered as risk 
factors for Turkey; however, many legislative laws were enacted to increase the efficacy 
of response to other types of disasters, including earthquakes. 
The 1999–2009 Period: The opening event of this period was the devastating 
earthquake of Marmara in 1999, which was one of the most destructive natural disasters 
in Turkish history. Since this earthquake caused Turkey to review its natural disaster-
management system, the innovations and modifications done in this period have named 
this era the awakening period. 
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b. Administrative Development 
As discussed previously, the milestones in the disaster-management system of 
Turkey include the Marmara Earthquake in 1999 and the foundation of AFAD in 2009. 
Even though the crisis-management system was highly centralized and strictly 
hierarchical before 1999; however, the adaptations and improvements made after 1999 
did not respond to the actual needs of a successful management strategy and effective 
organizational structure. 
During the pre-1999 era, the state was in the center of the process in assuming the 
dominant role in the disaster-management cycle. In other words, the crisis-management 
structure was “paternalistic, wherein the state was responsible for most phases of 
disasters” (Ganapati 2008). 
To continue with post-1999 period, the first benchmark in the disaster 
management history of Turkey was the Marmara Earthquake in 1999, for it manifested 
the weaknesses and inefficiencies of the previous disaster policies. The first reaction to 
the problematic structure was the foundation of the Turkish Emergency Management 
General Directorate (TEMGD) for the coordination of public organizations in 
emergencies. Another reaction was to increase the quality and the quantity of the 
manpower serving in the General Directorate of Civil Defense (GDCD). 
From a military perspective, the Turkish Armed Forces transformed one of its 
battalions to a search and rescue battalion to strengthen its effectiveness in disasters, and 
founded the Natural Disasters Search and Rescue Troop (Turkish Armed Forces, n.d.b.). 
During the pre-2009 period, the main government organizations responsible for 
disaster management were the Turkish Emergency Management Directorate (TEMGD) 
of the Prime Ministry, the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA) of the 
Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the General Directorates of Civil Defense 
(GDCD) of the Ministry of the Interior, and the General Directorate State Hydraulic 
Works (SHW) under Energy Ministry (Unlu, Kapucu and Sahin 2010). 
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c. Disaster Management System of Turkey After 2009 
In the light of devastating historical disasters, and after the tough lessons learned 
from the Marmara earthquake in 1999, Turkish congress determined to form a more 
comprehensive and effective structure that would meet the all the needs of a successful 
management program to sustain the efficacy and maximum utilization of resources in the 
response of disaster management operations. As a result of these legislative and executive 
processes, a new law, no. 5902, was enacted and promulgated in the governmental 
newspaper on June 17, 2009. According to this law, the Department of Civil Defense, 
Department of Emergency Management of Turkey, and Department of Disasters were 
shut down, and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) was 
founded. 
This new legislation aimed to increase measures that should be taken nationwide, 
improve the virtuous cycle of response after disaster; enhance the coordination and 
communication among the departments responsible for disaster management (Republic of 
Turkey Prime Ministry Disaster & Emergency Management Presidency, n.d.). Some 
major changes with this legislation were the creation of the following: 
• Disaster and Emergency Supreme Board 
• Disaster and Emergency Coordination Board 
• Earthquake Advisory Board 
 
d. Non-Profit Organizations and Civil Society in Crisis Management 
(1999‒2014) 
The Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), established in 1868, is one of the 
main NGOs within the disaster-management structures in Turkey. It has national, 
provincial, and district-level committees, and it actively operates in disaster areas 
(Turkish Red Crescent, n.d.). A well-equipped Disaster Operation Centre (AFOM) has 
also been established in Ankara (Turkish Red Crescent 2010). 
The development of NGOs in disaster management was another turning point for 
Turkey, which was achieved when the government gave up its “paternalistic” approach 
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and shared the responsibilities with non-profit organizations that had been underestimated 
until 1999 (Ganapati 2008). 
Another significant action taken after the 1999 earthquake was the establishment 
of an independent organization called the National Earthquake Council, which consists of 
scientists from different fields such as earth scientists, structural and earthquake 
engineers, environmental engineers, architects, urban planners, and psychologists. The 
goal of the council is to identify priority research areas for disaster mitigation in the 
country (Unlu, Kapucu and Sahin 2010). 
Some other important NGOs in disaster management include the Turkish Radio 
Amateur Club, which was founded in 1962 to provide post-disaster communication 
services (Turkiye Radyo Amatorleri Cemiyeti, n.d.), and Arama Kutarma Dernegi 
(AKUT), which is the leading model for many volunteer search and rescue organizations 
(Arama Kurtarma Dernegi, n.d.). 
3. Pakistan 
Since its creation in 1947, emergency response has remained a predominant 
approach in Pakistan to deal with disasters, mainly focusing on rescue and post-
disaster assistance. Several organizations and departments were established or 
mandated with disaster response. The Civil Defense Department was the first such 
structure established in 1951. It was primarily mandated to take protective measures 
against hostile actions by a foreign power, but it was also assigned additional tasks of 
taking remedial measures against natural or man-made disasters (WCDR 2005). The 
Calamity Act of 1958 remained as basic legislation for conduct and disaster 
management until 2006. Under this act, a system of relief was commissioned at a 
provincial level for disaster response management. It also provided for an Emergency 
Relief Cell in the cabinet secretariat to coordinate disaster response by the federal 
government (NDMA 2007a). 
Until 1970, the Pakistan Civil Defense was the focal agency for responding to 
disasters. In the aftermath of the 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the 
Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) was established, which became the government’s focal 
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point for emergency relief in disaster-hit areas (WCDR 2005). Severe floods of 1976 
compelled the government to take serious steps. As a result, it created the Federal Flood 
Commission (FFC) with responsibility for implementing flood prevention and mitigation 
measures, and organizing an early flood warning system. The FFC issued its first flood 
protection plan in 1978, with emphasis on structural works. The FFC also launched a 
comprehensive flood forecasting system in 1992, in response to disastrous floods that 
struck in same year (NDMA 2008). In 2003 a Task Force under the Ministry of Interior 
was set up for reorganizing emergency services with the objective of responding to 
disasters in a comprehensive manner. Based upon its recommendations, a dedicated 
Emergency Rescue Service could only be established in the province of Punjab (NDMA 
2011a). Other national agencies and departments contributing to emergency disaster 
relief also included the Crisis Management Cell (Ministry of Interior), local fire 
departments, police, and other ministries/departments (with a preview of their 
conventional charter of duties). Throughout this period, the Armed Forces of Pakistan 
played a key role in each significant disaster that occurred in the country. 
A disastrous earthquake that hit the country in 2005 is an important point in the 
disaster management history of Pakistan. The reactive crisis response approach was 
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the calamity. It forced officials to realize the 
inadequacies of existing disaster management approaches, and to adopt a comprehensive 
disaster-management approach and institutional arrangement to deal with future disasters. 
The change in thinking led to the National Disaster Management Ordinance in 2006, 
which promoted the current disaster-management system. The National Disaster 
Management Commission (NDMC) and National Disaster Management Authority 
(NDMA) were established at the national level. Subsequently, the Provincial Disaster 
Management Commissions (PDMCs) and Provincial Disaster Management Authorities 
(PDMAs) were established in all provinces. At the local level, District Disaster 
Management Authorities (DDMAs) were established at the district level. This new 
system envisaged a comprehensive all-hazard approach toward disaster management to 
reduce the risk through prevention, mitigation, and preparedness (NDMA 2011). 
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III. DISASTER-MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND THEIR 
FUNCTIONING DURING SPECIFIC CASES 
Several disaster management models offer varying organizational structures and 
entire disaster-management processes. The underlying reasons for adoption of a 
particular system by a country may vary from the nature of government, existing disaster-
management infrastructure, resource availability, the process through which a particular 
model has been evolved or adopted, and the societal approach to disaster management as 
a whole. Despite similar mission and objectives, differences in organizational structures 
and processes affect the performance of disaster-management organizations. In this 
chapter, we will look into current disaster-management systems, including the 
organizational structures and the processes being followed in Pakistan, Turkey, and the 
U.S. In addition, we will review the performance of respective national disaster-
management structures during specific natural disasters. 
A. PAKISTAN 
The National Disaster Management Ordinance in 20062 was re-enacted as an Act 
of Parliament,3 and became the legislation that provided for the establishment of the 
current National Disaster Management System of Pakistan. These documents provided 
significant guidance regarding new structures created as part of the National Disaster 
Management System, as well as their powers and functions. 
1. Organization of Disaster Management System 
Pakistan’s disaster management system is based upon separate policy-making 
commissions and executing agencies at various levels of the government.  
                                                
2 National Disaster Management Ordinance 2006, Public Law No. 2(1) / 2006 – Pub.(B).  http://saarc-
sdmc.nic.in/pdf/pakistan/file1.pdf. 
3 National Disaster Management Act 2010, Public Law No. F.9 (28) /2010 – Legis. 
http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1302135719_202.pdf. 
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a. Organizational Structure 






Figure 3.  Organizational Structure of Disaster Management System (from 
GOP 2007) 
b. Organizations and Their Functions 
Disaster management commissions are policy-making bodies responsible for 
setting parameters of disaster management operations for disaster management agencies 
at their respective levels. 
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National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC): It is the apex policy and 
the decision-making body on disaster management at a national level. It is headed by the 
prime minister, and includes other important functionaries, including the leader of 
political opposition, provincial chief ministers, heads of key federal ministries, and 
chairman of the NDMA. Some of the important functions of NDMC include: 
• Laying down policies on disaster management 
• Approving national disaster management plans 
• Establishing guidance to be followed by federal ministries and the 
provinces 
• Ensuring availability of necessary resources for capacity building as well 
as disaster management4 
Provincial Disaster Management Commission (PDMC): PDMC is the replica of 
NDMC at a provincial level. It is organized along similar lines and is responsible for 
policy and control functions in the respective provinces within the overall framework as 
approved by NDMC.5 
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA): NDMA is the lead agency 
at the federal level to deal with a whole spectrum of disaster management activities. It is 
the executive arm of NDMC. In the event of a disaster, all stakeholders, including 
government ministries, departments, organizations, Armed Forces, INGOs, NGOs, and 
UN Agencies comprise part of the NDMA to conduct a one-window operation. NDMA 
focuses on developing a sustainable operational capacity and professional competence to 
undertake the following tasks (NDMA, n.d.a). 
• Coordinating complete spectrum of disaster risk management at a national 
level 
• Developing guidelines and standards for national and provincial 
stakeholders regarding their role in disaster risk management 
                                                




• Providing technical assistance to federal ministries, departments, and 
provincial disaster management authorities for disaster risk-management 
initiatives 
• Holding training and awareness raising activities for capacity development 
of stakeholders, particularly in hazard-prone areas 
• Serving as lead agency for international cooperation in disaster risk 
management 
• Coordinating the emergency response of the federal government in the event 
of a national level disaster through the National Emergency Operations 
Centre (NEOC) 
• Preparing disaster risk management plans and implementation reviews 
• Overseeing the provision of funds for risk reduction and preparedness 
measures (NDMA 2007b). 
NDMA is organized into three wings, including disaster risk management (DRM), 
operations (Ops), and support and services (S&S). All operations are performed from its 
location in the national capital of Islamabad, with no permanent tentacles on the ground. 
Figure 4 shows an organizational structure of NDMA. When NDMA had to deal with the 
Flood of 2010, it had only Pakistani Rupee 65 million (approximately USD $74 million) 




Figure 4.  NDMA Organization (from NDMA 2011c) 
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Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA): PDMA is an executive 
arm of PDMC. Its mandate includes development and implementation of provincial 
disaster-management plans in accordance with guidelines provided by NDMA, and 
subsequently monitoring of operations within an area of jurisdiction. Salient functions of 
PDMA include: 
• Formulating provincial disaster management policy with the approval of 
PDMC 
• Coordinating and monitoring national policy, national plans, and 
provincial disaster management plans 
• Directing provincial departments /agencies regarding actions in response 
to any disaster 
• Coordinating the response of District Disaster Management Agencies 
during disasters and providing technical assistance when required 
• Promoting disaster awareness and education and community training.6 
District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA): DDMA is the body 
responsible for looking after disaster-management affairs at a district level. It is headed 
by the head of district government, and includes top government officials and heads of 
departments at a district level. Important tasks include: 
• Preparing district disaster management and response plans within the 
confines of provincial planes and policies 
• Coordinating and monitoring implementation of national, provincial, and 
district disaster-management policies and plans. 
• Incorporating disaster risk/mitigation factors into the development plans 
and projects 
• Controlling and coordinating disaster response efforts of all departments 
and agencies 
• Establishing stockpiles of rescue and relief goods and ordering release 
when required.7 
                                                




c. National Disaster Response Force 
The Disaster Management Act envisages the rise of a dedicated force for the 
purpose of specialist response to a threatening disaster situation. Four U.S.A.R teams 
have been created in Karachi, Islamabad, Mardan, and one with Army (NDMA 2013). 
d. Other Stakeholders 
The following organizations or departments have a role in the disaster-
management system (see Figure 5). Their roles vary from funding, assisting in capacity 











Figure 5.  Other Stakeholders 
2. National Disaster Management Strategy 
Failure of existing disaster management institutions to cope with the devastating 
earthquake of 2005 in Pakistan compelled the country to rethink its approach toward 
disaster management. Subsequent to its establishment, the NDMA came up with a 
National Disaster Risk Management Framework as a policy document to guide the work 
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of the entire disaster management system. The NDMA identified the following eight 
priority areas within this framework to establish and strengthen policies, institutions, and 
capacities over the next five years: 
• Institutional and legal arrangements for DRM 
• Hazard and vulnerability assessment 
• Training, education, and awareness 
• Disaster risk-management planning 
• Community and local level programming 
• Multi-hazard warning system 
• Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development 
• Emergency response system and capacity development for post-disaster 
recovery (NDMA, n.d.b). 
3. National Disaster Management Plans 
Pakistan’s NDMA designed their National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) in 
March 2010. This document covered subjects ranging from disaster risks being faced by 
the country, as well as the roles and functions of various response agencies, procedures 
pertaining to emergency declaration, and detailed guidelines regarding desired 
standards/best practices, and the standing operating procedures for different organizations 
(NDMA 2010). Despite being very detailed and informative, the NDRP of 2010 fell short 
of addressing resource allocation, risk mitigation, and capacity building. 
4. Floods 2010 and Response 
There are five main river systems flowing across the length of Pakistan, with the 
Indus River as the largest. There are several smaller tributaries that join the Indus River, 
further augmenting its tributary. For their water source, these rivers either depend upon 
the snow melting in the northern mountain ranges or seasonal monsoon rains, which 
usually occur between June and September each year. 
The flood in 2010 also had its origin in the monsoon. It started with an easterly 
monsoon system, and collided with the developing western system over the northwestern 
province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during the last week of July. What followed was heavy 
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rain that resulted in unprecedented floods in the Sawat and Kabul rivers. Flooding in 
these rivers was so severe that it seriously damaged Amandara Headworks on the Sawat 
River, and completely washed away Munda Headworks located further downstream on 
the Kabul River. The Federal Flood Commission reported a combined flow in the two 
rivers in excess of 400,000 cusecs, against the previous all-time high of 250,000 cusecs 
recorded in 1929 (FFC 2011). However, to further complicate the issue, it coincided with 
extensive rains in the catchment areas of the River Indus upstream of Nowshera (a 
junction point of the Kabul and the Indus Rivers) and River Jhelum. When floodwater 
travelled downstream, extreme floods were recorded in the Chashma and Taunsa barrages 
in Punjab and Sakur, and the Kotri Barrages in the Sind province, before ultimately 
falling into the Arabian Sea. Some important facts and figures to highlight the losses and 
damage caused by the floods include: 
• Population affected: 20,184,550 (approximately) 
• Deaths: 1,985 
• Injured: 2,946 
• Households Damage: 1,744,471 
• Area Impacted: 150,000 sq. km. 
• 78 of the country’s 141 districts were affected. Figure 6 shows affected 
flood areas 
• 3.4 million children under five years of age were among the affected 
• 600,000 expectant or lactating mothers were affected 
• 6.2 million consultations by September 20, 2010 for skin diseases, acute 
respiratory infections, acute diarrhea, suspected malaria, and bloody 
diarrhea 
• 12,516 school facilities either partially or fully damaged 
• Out of 2,957,500 health facilities, 500 were damaged or destroyed 
• 1.66 million homes were damaged or destroyed 
• 17 million acres (out of a total of 43 million acres) of farmland were 
affected 
• 9 million acres of standing crops lost 
• 1 million tons of stored grain lost 
 41 
• Planting of winter crops became difficult in affected areas because of 
water logged soil, lack of seeds and fertilizer 
• More than 1.2 million large and small animals killed and 6 million poultry 
lost 
• More than 5,000 miles of roads and railways were washed away (Niazi 
2011) 
 
Figure 6.  Flood-affected Areas (from DARA 2011) 
The NDMA led the response to the floods in 2010, being the Government of 
Pakistan’s agency responsible for disaster management. Its efforts to organize and 
coordinate the entire effort, however, promoted issues concerning its role versus other 
governmental institutions, such as the Economic Affairs Division, key line departments, 
and the PDMAs. The capacity of the PDMAs differed from province-to-province, with 
one in KPK performing much better due to its engagement in the handling of large-scale 
internally displaced persons in the province. The disaster-management system is still in 
the development stage and continues to link unresolved issues pertaining to the division 
of responsibilities and institutional capacity, which are sometimes delayed due to poor 
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cooperation with outside players (DARA 2011). In the field, the Army remains the first 
and the leading responder, as has been the case in previous disasters (CSIS 2011). 
However, in 2010, it was working in coordination with the NDMA and PDMAs at the 
national and provincial levels. With 60,000 troops employed during rescue and relief 
work, the Army rescued over 800,000 individuals, distributed 68,000 tons of rations, and 
established over 100 relief camps across the country (ISS 2010). One important link that 
seemed to be ineffective was the DDMA. These agencies were supposed to be the main 
disaster managers in the field, but remained ineffective due to multiple factors that 
included absence of elected local government bodies (whose head is also supposed to 
chair DDMA), lack of institutional capacity similar to the NDMA and PDMA, and the 
scarcity of dedicated disaster-management resources (CSIS 2011). 
Following are some of the issues identified by NDMA that were faced during 
disaster management: 
• Lack of disaster management capacity and paucity of resources 
• Lack of legislated authority to control activities of PDMA and/or DDMAs, 
etc. 
• Lean pre-disaster organizational structure and meager budgetary 
allotments ($74 million) 
• Presence of parallel decision-making bodies having overlapping mandates 
pertaining to disaster management. With the passage of the eighteenth 
constitutional amendment Council of Common Interest and National 
Oversight Disaster Management Committee have added another layer in 
National Disaster Management System (NDMA 2011d) 
B. TURKEY 
In following sections, a general overview of the disaster-management systems at 
the national and local levels is provided. The national disaster-management system, as 
previously discussed, was founded recently. This program provides centralized disaster 
management through a horizontal rather than a hierarchical structure. For a better 
understanding of these programs and their structure, see Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
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1. Organization of Disaster Management System 
After the foundation of the AFAD (Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency 
Management Presidency) in 2009, the complicated and problematic disaster management 
system of Turkey was reshaped. The new structure has provided Turkey with a more 
centralized national disaster-management organization. However, the uncertain 
responsibilities, ambiguous task allocation, and ineffective planning/programming, 
budgeting, and execution have remained true at the local level disaster-management 
organizations. 
a. National Level 
The AFAD is the national disaster-management organization of Turkey, which 
operates under the control of the presidency. Despite its central management structure, 
the AFAD does not have any hierarchical structure with under departments. The AFAD 
can outsource personnel depending upon the needs of the event or daily operations. 
Additionally, the AFAD can form and operate working groups by building coordination 
and cooperation with universities, public organizations, private sector, and NGOs. It 
accomplishes all these tasks thanks to its administratively horizontal and flexible 
structure with a results-oriented duty concept. “Based on the fact that disaster 
management is a subject that concerns all segments of the society, Law No. 5902 
established the Disaster and Emergency Supreme Board with participation of ministers 
for the purpose of making macro-level policies. The Disaster and Emergency 
Coordination Board, composed of top executives for ensuring coordination in matters 
related to disasters and the Earthquake Advisory Board, was established to ensure 
coordination in matters related to reducing earthquake risks and carrying out 
preparedness activities” (AFAD 2013a). 
Regarding the disaster-management and planning concept, Turkey has three 
governmental boards that determine the scope of the activities that AFAD carries out. 
These boards include the Disaster and Emergency Supreme Board, the Disaster and 
Emergency Coordination Board, and the Earthquake Advisory Board. AFAD chairs the 
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Earthquake Advisory Board; while its role is to execute the secretarial duties of the 
Supreme Board and the Coordination Board. 
Disaster and Emergency Supreme Board: The board is composed of appointed 
ministers under the chair of the prime minister or his/her appointed deputy prime 
minister. The main task of the board is to approve the plans, programs, and reports related 
to disasters and emergencies. The board operates under the control of a chair appointed 
by the president, and it convenes at least twice every year unless the chair requests an 
extraordinary meeting due to the emergency. 
Disaster and Emergency Coordination Board: The board operates under the 
chair of the office of Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry, and consists of 
undersecretaries and organization executives who are responsible to the chair. The main 
task of the board is to evaluate information related to disasters and emergencies, to 
determine necessary measures, to ensure and inspect their implementation, and to sustain 
coordination with agencies, organizations, and NGOs. The chair has the authority to 
summon the board for an extraordinary event; but normally, the board convenes at least 
four times a year. 
Earthquake Advisory Board: AFAD is the chair of the board, and the assigned 
representatives operate under the authority of AFAD. The main task of this board is to set 
“priorities and policies for earthquake-related researches, and to suggest activities for 
earthquake protection, mitigation of earthquake-related damage and losses, and activities 
to be carried out after earthquakes” (AFAD 2013a). 
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Figure 7.  AFAD Organization Chart (from AFAD 2013a) 
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Figure 8.  Disasters and Emergency Supreme Board (from AFAD 2013a) 
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b. Local Level 
Before 2009, the local level disaster-management systems were inconsistently 
showing variations within the provinces of Turkey. Despite the strict centralized 
authority, these lower-level disaster-management systems were acting as single and 
independent agencies with different principles and strategies. In fact, this irregular 
management problem showed up with devastating outcomes in 1999 after the 
catastrophic Marmara Earthquake. 
Due to the need for a strong national disaster-management system, Turkey 
decided to restructure a more centralized and more standardized system that included 
both provinces and municipalities. The main goal here was to eliminate the different 
practices among local level disaster-management authorities, and support the strategy and 
plans of the national level disaster management system with local governors and the 
resources under their control. 
The disaster management strategy of Turkey defines four main disaster levels (see 
Table 2), which require four different reactions. The first two levels require local reaction 
in the initial response phase, whereas the following two require more complex and 
detailed responses, such as national and international levels (AFAD 2013b). 
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Table 2.   Disaster Level and Responsibility 
Level Response Responsible Authority 
L1 Local capabilities are enough The Provincial Disaster and 
Emergency Directorate 
L2 Needs support from other 
provinces  
The Provincial Disaster and 
Emergency Directorate 
                    +  
Responsible Supportive 
Provinces 
L3 Needs national support Responsible Supportive 
Provinces  
                    +  
National Capacity 
L4 Needs international support Responsible Supportive 
Provinces  
                    +  
National Capacity 
                    +  
International Support 
 
Provincial Level: The provincial governors are directly responsible for the 
preparation of provincial emergency plans in accordance with national level plans. They 
coordinate and oversee the implementation and monitoring of emergency and response 
plans in times of disasters. The local disaster management organizations under the 
command of local governors determine the hazards and risk at a provincial level, and 
they operate the provincial disaster and emergency management center, which performs 
damage and loss assessments. Finally, these organizations carry out social awareness 
programs as well as joint trainings with NGOs and other voluntary groups (AFAD 
2013b). 
Municipal Level: Similar to provincial level, the governors of municipalities are 
responsible for the compatibility and feasibility of local disaster management plans with 
the provincial and national level plans. Municipalities have the role of coordination, 
arranging and implementing mitigation, prevention, and risk reduction activities in 
addition to preparation and implementation of master plans (AFAD 2013b). 
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2. National Disaster-management Strategy 
The main strategy of Turkey’s national disaster management is based on a 
centralized organizational structure whose strategic view is composed of: 
• Mission and Vision 
• Key Success Criteria and Performance Criteria 
• Values, Principles and Policies 
• Goals and Objectives (AFAD 2013a) 
a. Mission and Vision 
Due to the fact that Turkey is a high-risk country in terms of natural disasters, the 
AFAD states its main mission as “building a disaster-resilient society.” It is fairly hard to 
prevent earthquakes, floods, landslides, rock falls, droughts, storms, tsunamis, and many 
other disasters that have devastating effects on people, the environment, and the 
economy; however, it is possible to form a structure that is able to respond quickly to 
mitigate the devastating effects of these events on people and locations. Establishing this 
resilience will minimize the post-disaster damage by maximizing the efforts and the 
resources that will be used for relief operations. In summation, AFAD’s motto is: “we are 
prepared for the unexpected.” 
b. Key Success Criteria and Performance Criteria 
AFAD uses some rubrics in order to control and assess its organizational 
effectiveness. One of these charts is Key Success Criteria and Performance Criteria. This 
criterion is the golden tool for AFAD to improve its efficacy by considering the lessons 
learned from experienced events. These criteria are provided in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Assessment Criteria Chart (from AFAD 2013a) 
c. Values, Principles, and Policies 
The AFAD sets its main value at ensuring integrity and unity of the personnel in 
their jobs and relations. The value-based staffing policy of the AFAD helps it create more 
value in its operations, and build stronger loyalty and identification among its employees. 












d. Goals and Objectives 
AFAD claims that it has a “fully correct reading of the future” based on the 
information acquired from these works and estimations. 
The main goals and objectives are as follows: 
• Being a constantly developing and learning organization 
• Establishing a risk-centered integrated disaster management system 
• Generalizing disaster management standards 
• Launching out an educational campaign for disaster preparedness 
• Being a leading organization in the international arena (AFAD 2013a). 
3. National Disaster Management Plans 
The kind, number, and impact of disasters increase in parallel to the changes in 
environment, demography, climate, and social and economic indicators of the evolving 
world. As the central and commanding organization, AFAD aims to alleviate the effects 
of these changes through an Integrated Disaster Management System in Turkey. “The 
main founding purpose of AFAD is to ensure the most effective execution of the 
integrated disaster management system before, during, and after disasters and 
emergencies, and in this sense to ensure high-level national and international 
coordination in this context” (AFAD 2013b). 
AFAD focuses on four main criteria such as: reducing losses from disasters, 
ensuring disaster preparedness, ensuring disaster response, and promoting fast recovery. 
To meet its target criteria, AFAD: 
• “Cooperates with all relevant national and international agencies and 
organizations for effective planning, management, support and 
coordination of necessary activities in line with specified standards, 
• Promotes disaster awareness and culture in the public by carrying out 
research, development and education activities, 
• Ensures that protective and preventive measures are taken within the 
framework of the principle of social state” (AFAD 2013b). 
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AFAD conducts the following tasks that are mandated by the United Nations 
regarding the disaster risk reduction and development plans: 
• “Collection of necessary basic data on disaster risks and development of 
planning tools so as to monitor the relationship between the development 
policy and disaster risk, 
• Collection and dissemination of data required for making the best and 
most effective development plan and policy to reduce disaster risk, 
• Re-orienting development and disaster risk reduction sectors, mobilizing 
and warning the public” (AFAD 2013b). 
4. Van Earthquake and Response 
On Sunday, October 23, 2011, at 10:41 GMT (13:41 Local), an earthquake whose 
magnitude was 7.2 (Mw), and whose depth was 19 km, hit the Van province in Turkey. 
“Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute (KOERI, 
www.koeri.boun.edu.tr/sismo/indexeng.htm, ww.kandilli.info) reported that the 
earthquake originated at a depth of about 5km, and that the epicenter was located at 43.36 
N 38.76 E, at the village of Tabanli, between the major cities of Van and Ercis” (Erdik et 
al. 2011). 
The population of Van in 2011 was 1,022,532 (1.4 percent of the population of 
Turkey), with a population of 363,419 (municipal), 526,725 (total). Erciş was reported to 
have a population of 76,473 (municipal), and 159,450 (total) (Turkish Statistical Institute 
2011). 
The effects and losses of the disaster were catastrophic. AFAD reported the 
outcomes as 604 fatalities and 2,608 injuries (Afet ve Acil Durum Yonetim Badkanligi, 
n.d.). There was also a subsequent earthquake, 5.6 (Mw) in magnitude and 5km in depth, 
which resulted in the collapse of two big hotels, with 40 additional fatalities. In addition, 
33,016 buildings, 28,532 housings, 2,440 workplaces, and 8,254 yarns were collapsed or 
severely damaged. 
Experts estimated the cost of these earthquakes at approximately 1–2 billion U.S. 
dollars (Afet ve Acil Durum Yonetim Badkanligi, n.d.). 
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The response phase started with search-and-rescue operations within the first 6-
hour period after the earthquake, all of which were coordinated by the AFAD. Due to the 
high significance level of the earthquake, AFAD responded to the disaster with the help 
of the local disaster-management organizations of supportive provinces, as well as 
military, Red Crescent, volunteers, and NGOs. The numbers of these response teams 
increased throughout the 72-hour response period. The numbers of response phase are as 
follows: 
• 140 response teams with 5,267 staff in total 
• 2,976 medical staff 
• 201 ambulances 
• 11 mobile field hospitals 
• 76,802 tents 
• 80 Turkish Airlines, 76 military and 20 private cargo planes 
• Search and rescue and first aid teams from 48 provinces and 39 
organizations (Afet ve Acil Durum Yonetim Badkanligi, n.d.). 
The Turkish military was in close coordination with AFAD since the very 
beginning of the Van earthquake. Immediately after the earthquake, the Department of 
the Chief of Staff inaugurated the Natural Disaster Management and Coordination 
Command in Van and its affected county of Ercis. This command coordinated the 
operation of military activities with AFAD and other organizations. Based on the needs 
of the relief operations, the Department of the General Staff assigned the DAK (Natural 
Disaster Search and Rescue Team) battalion, in addition to the support of the JOAK 
(Gendarmerie Special Search and Rescue Team) battalion to provide logistics support, 19 
military cargo airplanes, and 14 military utility helicopters were assigned under the 
command and control of these teams. 
After the initial response, and due to the increased demands, six battalions on 
September 23 and five battalions on September 24 were assigned to the region for the 
tasks of transportation, search and rescue, security, debris disposal, first aid, tent set up, 
and distribution of aid supplies. 
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The assigned helicopters operated 154 sorties, and transported 200 wounded and 
patients to both military and governmental hospitals in sum. Similarly, military cargo 
planes operated 140 sorties in order to transport 415 tones supplies, medical equipment 
and food, as well as the 292 search and rescue personnel, and 2378 military and civilians 
affected to the west part of the country (Turkish Armed Forces n.d.a). 
Additionally, Azerbaijan, Mexico, Iran, Spain, France, Belgium, Japan, Sweden 
and Malaysia attended search and rescue operations with two teams; namely, 12 
international teams joined in the response phase after the Van earthquake (Provincial 
Secretariat of Van 2012). 
During the response phase several problems emerged which can be classified as 
pre-disaster and post-disaster failures. During the pre-disaster phase, the zoning and 
planning layout of Van was insufficient to deal with the potential earthquakes. Since Van 
is located on a critical tectonic plaque vulnerable to earthquakes, the inadequate 
urbanization and agricultural landing aggravated the effects of seismic waves moving on 
these settlements. One other pre-disaster problem was the poor construction and 
infrastructure of the city. For example, only 15 percent of approximately 60,000 
structures had a legal license and architecture signature in Van just before the earthquake. 
The risk awareness and basic disaster training of residents were fairly weak for a 
successful individual response. All these aspects show the failure of local regulations as 
well as governance and legislative insufficiencies that were intensified by weak control 
and coordination. 
In all disaster-management cases, the most vital failures generally occur within 
the first 72 hours of the response phase. Likewise, the post-disaster failures regarding the 
Van earthquake occurred mostly during the initial response and included the following: 
• Failure to sustain order among the chaotic population caused tyranny and 
looting in the region. This turmoil prevented search-and-rescue teams 
from detecting and marking the damaged buildings and cleaned zones. 
• Failure to make correct estimations about the amount of provisions, 
supplies, vehicles, and tents caused many people to suffer physically in 
addition to their psychological stress. 
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• Failure to pre-determine potential warehouses and storing places caused 
ineffective allocation of supplies that came from all around the country. 
• Failure of AFAD, as a leading organization during the disaster, to 
coordinate and utilize the efforts of other organizations, military forces, 
and volunteers caused prolonged waiting times for transportation of 
manpower, relief provisions. 
• Failure to establish a local crisis desk caused imperfect and incomplete 
information flow, which misled the AFAD’s executive board at its 
headquarters. 
• Unprepared local teams and uneducated local people subverted the 
situational awareness by creating chaos and disorder during the response. 
• Having only local response plans, which did not include possible 
additional teams and organizations from national and international level, 
caused many resources as well as manpower redundant and ineffective. 
The inflexible plans did not let imminent alternative actions get included 
to the current response (Erdik et al., 2012; Turan 2012; Mehdi and 
Nazamar 2013). 
C. THE U.S.A. 
With a changed environment following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government 
adopted a new “all hazard” approach. The Homeland Security Act8 led to creation of 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). A new department was made responsible for 
dealing with all internal threats to the country. Twenty-two agencies, including the 
Federal Disaster Management agency (Figure 11), were placed under the control of the 
DHS, and hence it became responsible for disaster management at the federal level. 
                                                
8 The Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, Public Law 107-296, U.S. Statutes at large116 (2002): 2135, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf.   
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Figure 11.  DHS organizational Chart (from DHS, n.d.a) 
1. Organization of Disaster-management System 
As a relatively mature organization in comparison to AFAD and NDMA, FEMA 
has a unique and quite effective organizational structure to cover the needs and potential 
risk factors of the U.S. domestically, and to provide foreign support when requested. 
FEMA has a decentralized structure that is beneficial in terms of fast and effective 
decision-making, planning, and response; however, it is also sluggish in terms of funding, 
budgeting, and appropriations of the organization. 
a. Organization Structure 
The U.S. disaster-management system is organized to function based upon the 
guiding principles of engaged partnership, tiered response, scalable/flexible/adaptable 
capabilities, unity of effort through unified command and readiness to act (DHS 2008a) 
without a hierarchical structure. It includes administratively independent disaster 
response agencies at federal, state, and local levels. FEMA is the agency responsible for 
coordinating, streamlining, and executing disaster response at the national level. 
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b. Organizations and Their Functions 
FEMA is the lead agency for emergency management at the federal level. FEMA 
states its mission as “to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation 
we work together to build, sustain and improve our capability to prepare for, protect 
against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards” (FEMA 2014a). Goals set 
forth to fulfill its mission include: 
• Lead the nation’s disaster management efforts 
• Partner with other stakeholders (states, local governments and other 
agencies) to build a national emergency management system 
• Develop federal emergency response capability 
• Integrate agency’s emergency management responsibilities for effective 
response to all types of disasters 
• Develop and maintain regional offices to work with local authorities to 
identify and address local needs 
• Provide funding, training, technical, and other assistance to build national, 
state and local level capabilities to deal with disasters 
• Develop and coordinate implementation of all hazard risk based disaster 
management strategy (DHS, n.d.b). 
As of October 2011, FEMA has 7,474 employees, including managers and 
emergency workers at its headquarters, and 10 regional setups (FEMA 2014a). For year 
2010/2011 FEMA’s annual budget allocation, excluding USD 4.1 billion program grants, 




Figure 12.  Organizational structure of FEMA (from FEMA 2013a) 
State Emergency Management Organization: Each state has an emergency 
management office. This department may be located in the governor’s office, in the 
department of public safety, or can be a stand-alone agency, or integrated into state 
homeland security departments. State emergency management departments rely upon 
federal funding for their emergency management budget as a homeland security function 
(NEMA, n.d.). Their role generally parallels the role of FEMA at the federal level. 
• Perform and maintain the provisions of emergency management 
legislations 
• Work to improve emergency management in the state 
• Supplement, support, and guide local emergence management efforts 
• Prepare and maintain state emergency management plans and a state 
emergency operations center 
• Ensure implementation of national emergency strategy prepared by DHS / 
FEMA (FEMA 2014b) 
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Local Emergency Management Organizations: Being closest to the scene of 
the incident, local governments (county and municipal) are the first ones to respond to 
any emergency. If the scale and scope is limited, their emergency management resources 
may be the only ones to be activated. A local emergency management office may vary in 
size depending upon the size of the jurisdictions. It may follow the pattern of the state 
government. That is to say, it may be integrated into other departments such as the fire 
department, the police department, or public works (McEntire, n.d.), Roles of a local 
emergency manager or department include: 
• Advise and inform local chief executive on emergency management 
• Advocate for disaster-related laws, policies and regulations 
• Coordinate and support functioning of emergency services 
• Lead disaster management planning efforts at local level 
• Maintain local emergency operation Centre 
• Emergency management training and preparedness exercises 
• Promote emergency management awareness 
• Implementation of federal and state emergency management guidelines 
(FEMA, n.d.) 
Other Stake Holders: There are hosts of other departments and agencies that 
work with the emergency managers at various levels for disaster management. Some of 
these are: 
• Department of Defense 
• Department of Energy 
• Department of Education 
• Department of Housing 
• Department of Transportation 
• Department of Justice 
• Department of Interior 
• Social Security Administration 
• Social Benefit Administration 
• Office Personnel Management 
• NGOs, etc. 
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2. National Disaster Management Strategy 
At the time of Hurricane Irene, the National Response Framework 2008 (DHS 
2008a) was the key document which laid down the guiding principles for all response 
partners for preparation and response during disasters; it included response doctrines and 
discussed other important aspects, such as roles and responsibilities, response 
organizations, and guidelines regarding planning. Response doctrine is based upon the 
following six key principles. 
• Engaged Partnership expecting the leader across the emergency 
management system to communicate and support engaged partnerships by 
developing shared goals and aligning the capabilities of partner 
organizations to prevent any one component being overwhelmed in the 
course of a disaster 
• Tiered Response requiring disaster management to begin at lowest 
possible level and provide for additional capabilities when needed 
• Scalable, Flexible, and Adaptable Operational Capabilities 
highlighting the need for building the capabilities that could be adjustable 
to the nature and scope of the disaster. 
• Unity of Effort Through Unified Command by developing common 
objective and goals ensuring effective coordination and optimum 
utilization of all available resources while respecting the authority and 
responsibilities of each partner. 
• Readiness to Act by keeping abreast with the scope/size of risk and being 
suitably positioned to get into action when needed (DHS 2008b) 
3. National Disaster Management Plans 
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is another important 
document pertaining to disaster management in the U.S.A.. Its main purpose is to provide 
a uniform disaster-management framework by offering a consistent approach for tackling 
disaster incidents. The underlying principles of NIMS are flexibility and standardization, 
which makes it a useful tool at all levels of response from local authorities and states, as 
well as federal agencies irrespective of the magnitude of the incident. Standardization 
helps in cooperation and integration of resources coming from various governmental and 
non-governmental disaster response providers. Being a template, it enables specific 
agencies and authorities to prepare respective action plans according to the specific 
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environments and the resources available. There are five interlinked components 
covering best disaster management practices to make up a system approach. These 
include: 
• Preparedness 
• Communication and information management 
• Resource management 
• Command management 
• Ongoing management and maintenance (FEMA 2008) 
4. Hurricane Irene and Response 
Irene was the first hurricane that hit the United States since Hurricane Ike in 
Texas, in September 2008, and it was the first storm that affected the New York City area 
since Hurricane Gloria in September 1985 (NOAA 2011b). Irene was similar in size to 
Hurricane Katrina, whose hurricane force winds extended outward about 104 miles with 
tropical storm force winds felt up to 230 miles. Similarly, Irene’s hurricane force winds 
extended outward up to 90 miles from the center, and tropical storm force winds 
extended outward up to 290 miles (Spotts 2011). 
The effects of Hurricane Irene were felt from the U.S. Virgin Islands and 
Puerto Rico to the Canadian Maritime Provinces, and as far west as the 
Catskill Mountains of New York. The storm produced widespread, 
devastating flooding in Vermont, New York, New Jersey, and parts of 
New Hampshire and damaging storm surge along the coasts of North 
Carolina and Connecticut (NOAA 2011c). 
As for floods, 26 rivers deluged into eight in New Jersey, 14 in New York, and 
four in Vermont (CIESEN, Columbia University). Irene caused widespread destruction 
resulting in about $15.6 billion just in the United States, and at least 56 deaths (NHC 
2012), which made it the seventh costliest hurricane in United States history, ranking 
behind Hurricane Andrew in 1992, Hurricane Ivan in 2004, Hurricanes Wilma and 
Katrina both in 2005, Hurricane Ike in 2008, and Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The financial 
costs of Irene in the Caribbean and Canada were $830 million and $130 million, 
respectively, for a total of almost $16.6 billion in damages (Fieser 2011; ICLR 2012). 
According to the records of Columbia University, 80 million people were within the 200 
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mile-range of the storm, and 49 million of them were within a 100 mile-radius, and were 
seriously affected in terms of utilities such as electricity, water, and gas. Additionally, 2.3 
million people were forced to evacuate their homes and lands, including one million in 
New Jersey, 315,000 in Maryland, 300,000 in North Carolina, 200,000 in Virginia, 
100,000 in Delaware, and 300,000 people in New York City. Moreover, more than 
10,000 flights were canceled between August 27 and 28, and many roads were closed in 
the affected areas. As a result, Hurricane Irene became the tenth billion-dollar disaster in 
2011 by breaking the annual record dating back to 1980 (NCDC 2013). 
FEMA was in close contact and coordination with the affected locations through 
its offices in Boston, Philadelphia, New York City, Atlanta, and even in Puerto Rico. 
After the declaration of emergency by the government, a response administration was 
assigned under FEMA to gather and allocate resources of the federal government. As per 
the requirement of response, FEMA deployed teams to both Puerto Rico and the U.S., 
and without losing time FEMA commenced to collaborate with federal, state, territorial, 
tribal, and local partners, as well as voluntary organizations, the private sector, and others 
to prepare for potential impacts of Hurricane Irene and to mitigate its outcomes (FEMA 
2011). 
Friday, August 19: FEMA began closely monitoring the large tropical wave that 
eventually strengthens into Hurricane Irene. FEMA’s mission was to support citizens and 
responders to aggregate all the national efforts in order to utilize the capability and 
maintain the preparation, response, protection, and mitigation in pre- and post-disaster 
phases (FEMA 2012). 
Saturday, August 20 and Sunday, August 21: New York and the Caribbean 
Area Offices of FEMA carried out their contact and coordination with the U.S. Virgin 
Islands Territory Emergency Management Agency and the Puerto Rico Emergency 
Management Agency. Liaison officers and expert personnel who worked directly with 
territory and local officials conducted  this coordination and contact. Granted, FEMA 
had many federal resources such as millions of liters of water, millions of meals and 
hundreds of thousands of blankets, strategically located at distribution centers throughout 
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the United States and its territories. Also, FEMA strategically located some of these 
resources in Puerto Rico, for example, more than 200,000 liters of water, more than 
400,000 meals, and more than 1,400 cots and blankets were all located just in case of 
worst-case scenario (FEMA 2012). 
Monday, August 22: FEMA stayed in close contact and formed a strong 
information network with governors and response teams in the U.S. Virgin Islands and 
Puerto Rico, while they conducted response efforts and damage assessments of the 
hurricane. Depending upon its processed data and surveillance, FEMA started to create 
contacts with emergency management officials along the east coast and other states that 
were under threat. The high-ranking officers of FEMA conducted daily calls with their 
regional offices, the governors of the states and territories affected or under threat. 
FEMA’s Regional Response Coordination Center in New York served as a coordination 
center to optimize the efforts of response as well as to minimize the destruction of 
hurricane. In order to enhance this process, FEMA activated a National Response 
Coordination Center for carrying out 24-hour operations by closely monitoring the data 
related to the hurricane (FEMA 2013b). 
Tuesday, August 23: FEMA teams were deployed to staging areas in Georgia 
and Pennsylvania upon their predictions regarding the potential impact areas along the 
east coast of the U.S. Simultaneously, FEMA administrators, and their federal partners, 
carried on informing the governors of the states and territories affected or under threat 
(FEMA 2013). 
Wednesday, August 24: Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was assigned as an Incident 
Support Base to coordinate federal response operations to Hurricane Irene. This base was 
crucial for FEMA and its partners to effectively deploy equipment and provisions nearby 
the affected areas, which made the transportation and logistics networking process 
quicker and less costly. Besides, The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers deployed the 
personnel of the 249th Engineering Battalion (Prime Power) to Puerto Rico to assist with 
restoring power to the island. In addition, The National Guard Bureau was also assigned 
in Puerto Rico to support clearing of the roads and debris, to transport equipment, to 
provide communications, and to carry out urban search and rescue efforts as well as 
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public safety and security needs.  FEMA and the military were in coordination with The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Hurricane 
Center, which was monitoring Hurricane Irene. In addition, U.S. NORTHCOM and U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG) deployed personnel to Puerto Rico for assisting the response 
operations (FEMA 2012). 
The American Red Cross attended relief operations by forming volunteer teams 
assigned to North Carolina and South Carolina, and by sending food and communications 
equipment to east coast states. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food 
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) handled the task of informing residents about the 
potential threats and effects of hurricane in order to minimize the potential for foodborne 
illnesses in the event of power outages, flooding, and other problems that could be 
associated with the storm (FEMA 2012). 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
Disasters are diverse and wide-ranging phenomena. It is not the frequency of 
occurrence, but the unfortunate outcome that brings varying types of incidents under the 
common title of disaster. Another characteristic is the variation in magnitude of disaster 
that affects the outcome. Yet when a disaster of similar nature and magnitude hits 
different geographies and terrain, the outcomes may have great dissimilarities. Similarly, 
there is great variation in the approach to handling and managing of disaster response in 
different countries and societies. These differences are linked with the state of progress, 
prosperity, and societal norms. These sources of variation make an objective comparison 
between disaster management in different countries very difficult. However, we can 
always look at the parts within different systems to get an understanding of similarities 
and differences with respect to disaster management in approach and handling of 
disasters. 
A. EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
There appears to be a major difference as to how the disaster-management 
systems in the U.S., Turkey, and Pakistan took shape and achieved their current 
structures. In the case of the U.S., it has been a gradual evolutionary process based upon 
the realization of the deficiencies of incumbent systems that led to current disaster 
management procedures, mechanisms, and the organizational structures. In the case of 
both Turkey and Pakistan, where for a large part of their modern existence, a reactive 
approach remained the dominant norm, it was only a devastating disaster striking each 
country in the beginning of the twenty-first century that caused them to change and adopt 
a comprehensive disaster management approach and organizational structures that could 
meet the requirements thereof. Models adopted in the two countries are similar and bear 
the marks of guidance and support of the UN and other international disaster-
management organizations. Though comprehensive, a model may not be very effective 
due to the lack of necessary capacities and skills at various levels, which will require 
large resources and time to build. 
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1. Disaster Management – Organizational Structure 
Disaster-management systems in the three countries under consideration follow a 
similar pattern. They all revolve around multi-tiered disaster management capacity 
beginning from local level and going up to state/province and ultimately the 
federal/national level. Despite similarity in approach, there is much difference in the 
effectiveness of these structures. In the case of the U.S., a whole structure actually grew 
up from the local level, and hence, there is sufficient emergency management and a 
capacity (proportionate to population and resources) to exist at a county, town, and city 
level. Turkish and Pakistani disaster-management systems also identify the importance of 
local-level response as a starting point for all disaster-management activities. That said, 
required emergency management departments either do not exist or lack physical 
capacity at a local level. This lack of capacity was observed during the floods of 2010 
and the Van earthquake, resulting in overdependence on other players, such as armed 
forces for emergency response, and other countries and international organizations for 
subsequent assistance. A glaring example with regard to lack of capacity is absent in 
dedicated disaster managers at local levels; hence, administrative officials are assigned 
this responsibility as an additional task. 
2. Approach To Disaster Management 
A great deal of difference exists in how disaster management is approached as a 
function. In the U.S., it is reflected as an important subject, and emergency management-
related requirements are considered important factors when making decisions. This 
ensures relevant safety requirements are built in all private projects, whether small or 
large. A greater emphasis on disaster mitigation ultimately saves efforts required for 
disaster management, relief, and rehabilitation. In the cases of Turkey and Pakistan, 
although the prevailing disaster-management laws entail disaster mitigation as planning 
considerations for all developmental projects, they are far from being fully practiced. 
This issue is even more neglected in private projects. The root cause of problems is 
partially linked to the lack of realization of the possible sufferings and losses, but to a 
greater extent to the resource constraints. With limited resources available, disaster 
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management falls very low on the agenda of government and the public both trying to 
either fulfill more fundamental requirements or achieving short-term goals. A 
consequence of the difference between the two approaches is apparent from the huge 
difference between quanta of losses sustained during disasters in all countries. 
B. NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AGENCIES 
Whereas FEMA was built upon the Civil Defense Agency to coordinate disaster 
management functions at federal level, the AFAD and NDMA are altogether new 
creations created in the wake of a major disaster more recently to develop a capacity for 
handling the next disaster. Notwithstanding the agency maturity factor linked with 
respective operational lives, there are several other contexts that can be used to analyze 
relative efficacy, strengths, and weaknesses. 
1. Position Within Government Structure 
As part of DHS, FEMA is responsible to the U.S. President through the Secretary 
of DHS. The AFAD and NDMA are independent agencies directly responsible to the 
chief executive and Prime Minister in both Turkey and Pakistan. A shorter chain of 
command makes it easier for the disaster management agencies of Turkey and Pakistan to 
obtain strategic direction, as well as rallying the resources of other federal governmental 
department during any disaster management operation. The direct link with the chief 
executive technically also facilitates securing federal budget as opposed to the second 
case, where FEMA first has to compete for required resources at the DHS level. 
2. Agency Structure 
FEMA has a decentralized structure as compared with the AFAD and NDMA. It 
has a central office to look after the centralized functions, as well as regional offices for 
conduct of disaster-management operations in respective areas of responsibility. Regional 
offices enhance the agency-level understanding and preparedness regarding specific 
needs as well as the speed with which it can react to any situation. Presence of regional 
offices also improves the coordination and liaison with state and local disaster 
management agencies. In the cases of Turkey and Pakistan, AFAD and NDMA are 
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totally centralized agencies with no regional offices and therefore dependent upon the 
provincial and local governments for information regarding situation as well as conduct 
of disaster management activities. 
3. Role of National Disaster Management Agencies 
The primary role of FEMA, AFAD, and NDMA is to act as the lead disaster 
management agency for their respective countries. Accordingly, they have a number of 
similar roles revolving around: 
• Coordination of disaster-management effort at federal/national level 
• Capacity building of state/provincial and local disaster management 
agencies 
• Technical assistance to state/provincial and local disaster management 
agencies 
• Development of disaster management guidelines and standards 
• International disaster management cooperation 
• Promoting risk management monitoring, preparation and implementation 
In addition to these important roles, FEMA is also assigned to build federal 
disaster management capability and maintain regional offices. Manifestation of these 
roles enables FEMA to have dedicated disaster management resources, making it an 
executing agency in addition to planning and coordination functions. This capability 
makes FEMA a more potent emergency management agency as compared to AFAD and 
NDMA. 
4. Disaster Management Capacity 
Notwithstanding the organizational structures and the work process, the capacity 
of any organization can be the most important limiting factor regarding its ability to 
fulfill its objectives. There are two important factors that contribute to the capacity of a 
disaster-management agency, which are manpower and the budget. The budget enables or 
prevents the organization form developing and maintaining sufficient disaster 
management skills, infrastructure, and equipment. A comparative state of manpower and 
the budget of three agencies during the year when Hurricane Irene, Van Earthquake, and 
 69 
the Flood of 2010 struck, reveals significant disaster management capacity in each case. 
The data provided in Table 3 highlights comparative understaffing and resource 
constraints of the AFAD and NDMA for undertaking effective disaster management. 












FEMA 7474 24.26 6180         .16 
AFAD 283 3.77 688,042     .0025 
NDMA 21 .17 65     .0027 
 
C. DISASTER MANAGEMENT DURING SPECIFIC CASES 
Hurricane Irene, the Van Earthquake, and the Flood of 2010, truly reflect a 
possible variation in the nature of disasters. All of them affected sizable populations 
including 49 million in the U.S., one million in Turkey, and 20 million in Pakistan, and 
inflicted huge loses of life and property. While an earthquake is a spontaneous event, 
hurricanes and floods take a longer time to develop and gradually move through different 
affected areas. In spite of various differences in nature and magnitude, some comparison 
pertaining to a disaster-management effort by respective national disaster-management 
agencies during said disasters. 
1. Mitigation 
Hurricane Irene: It is not possible to predict the course of a hurricane and area 
likely to be affected before it starts developing; losses can only be minimized through 
effective mitigation measures. Out of 49 million people affected by Hurricane Irene, 56 
died. This relatively small death toll reflects the effectiveness of disaster mitigation 
efforts of FEMA, which revolves around greater awareness and building codes, as well as 
evacuation of 2.3 million people from threatened areas. 
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Flood of 2010: Flood affected areas are easier to predict as they are mostly the 
same low lying areas along the rivers and other waterways, and hence, easier to plan for. 
However, during the flood of 2010, 1985 persons out of 20 million affected population 
died whereas 0.8 million had to be rescued in the event, and nearly 1.7 million houses 
collapsed due to flood water, all highlighting lack of required attention regarding disaster 
mitigation. These losses could have been minimized through settlement controls, 
effective building codes, as well as greater public awareness regarding likelihood of 
floods in their areas. 
Van Earthquake: A large number of deaths and destruction of houses can be 
attributed to poor building controls again reflecting a lack of disaster mitigation. 
2. Response 
Performance of a disaster management system during the response phase can also 
be measured from the role played by various components as well as the swiftness with 
which required assistance was provided to the affected people. 
Hurricane Irene: During the response phase, all components of the U.S.A.’s 
disaster management system played an active role to support the affected population. 
Salient features of operation during said period revolved around: 
• Lead role played by FEMA, who started monitoring the situation right 
from the development stage of hurricane. 
• Information actively shared within FEMA and the states likely to be 
affected by the calamity. 
• Consistent coordination between FEMA, state governors, and states’ 
disaster-management agencies 
• Pre-positioning of relief resources closer to the likely disaster hit areas 
• Constant liaison between regional offices of FEMA, state officials, and 
state disaster-management agencies 
• Provision of large quantities of relief goods to those affected 
Flood of 2010: When the flood of 2010 hit the NDMA had been operative for 
four years. The disaster moved gradually across the length of Pakistan inundating large 
parts of all four provinces. Due to a lack of effective disaster mitigation procedures and 
 71 
activities, the response phase assumed greater importance needing a huge effort to help 
the people who were caught up in the floods. In our assessment the salient features of 
operations were: 
• NDMA was the lead agency coordinating relief efforts at a national level 
• Due to lack of its integral disaster management resources NDMA was 
mainly coordinating availability of resources to PDMAs as well as 
activities of international agencies and non-governmental organizations 
• Although PDMAs provided necessary relief goods, due to their lack of 
capacity, Armed Forces had a lead role in search and rescue, as well as 
delivery of immediate relief goods to the affected people 
• DDMAs that were supposed to be the mainstay of disaster management 
efforts remained the weakest link due to lack resources in terms of 
disasters managers and field workers 
• Being a small and centralized agency, NDMA could not focus beyond the 
areas already affected by flood wave, hence necessary safe guards and 
preparations in downstream areas could not be undertaken. Said deficiency 
resulted in an otherwise avoidable larger requirement of emergency effort 
• System still b in infancy stage had control and coordination issues 
involving NDMA as well as PDMAs and other federal departments 
• Lack of public awareness, effective warning system, and timely 
evacuation from affected areas increased requirement of search and rescue 
as well as relief assistance 
Van Earthquake: The earthquake affected a relatively smaller geographic area. 
There was no pre-disaster warning, which can be attributed to the very nature of the 
disaster as well as advanced seismic activity monitoring capability. At the time of the 
disaster, AFAD had been in operation for only two years. In our assessment, salient 
observations regarding disaster response are: 
• AFAD was lead disaster management agency 
• Lack of sufficient disaster mitigation in face of degree of disaster 
vulnerability was the major cause of fatalities and losses owing to 
inadequate settlement planning, poor building controls, and lack of public 
awareness 
• Inadequate and inflexible local disaster response plans prevented timely, 
effective, and optimal utilization of additional resources 
• Gaps in coordination and poor information sharing can be attributed to 
ineffectiveness of incident command system which led to delays in 
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transportation of supplies, evacuation of casualties, and employment of 
disaster response teams 
• Required disaster management resources were gradually brought into the 
disaster-hit area 




This chapter deals with recommendations for making natural disaster-
management systems of Pakistan, Turkey, and the U.S. more effective. Most of these 
pertain to Pakistan and Turkey whose disaster-management systems have been found 
lacking in disaster-management approach, organizational issues, and resource allocation. 
A. DISASTER MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
Although all essential elements have been incorporated into disaster-management 
strategies and plans of Pakistan and Turkey, there is still a need to back up the policies 
with practical steps. These include: 
1. Proportionate emphasis and resource allocation for disaster mitigation and 
disaster response. Effective disaster mitigation will not only reduce 
disaster-related losses/casualties but also cut down the resources required 
for disaster response. 
2. Disaster awareness at the grassroots level should be adopted as the 
cornerstone of any disaster-management policy. It should be made part of 
education right from the beginning and incorporated/enforced on all 
private and public projects. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 
Disaster-management structures of both Pakistan and Turkey are relatively new, 
and do not come up through the process of organizational evolution; therefore, these 
structures’ components lack in organization, knowledge, experience, and capacity to 
work effectively and harmoniously during a major disaster. The following areas need 
attention in this regard: 
• Organizational Capacity: Size of national disaster-management agencies 
needs to be increased in proportion to population and geographical area of 
the respective country and gradually brought closer to the FEMA standard. 
• Disaster Response Capability: NDMA and AFAD should develop 
dedicated disaster-response capability and other organizations, i.e., armed 
forces to be used as an additional resource only. 
• Organizational Structure: NDMA and AFAD should have a regional 
presence at the provincial/state level to ensure timely/swift response as 
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well as better coordination with provincial/state disaster-management 
agencies. 
• Disaster Management Training: Conduct extensive training and exercises 
to make up for lack of experience, test the efficacy of plans and streamline 
procedures with provincial disaster-management agencies and other 
stakeholders. 
• Staffing at Lower Levels: Being first respondents, distract/local disaster-
management agencies should be made effective through availability of 
dedicated and professional disaster managers/staff. 
• Disaster Response Capability at Grassroots Level: Build disaster-response 
capability at the local level by supplementing and/or raising emergency 
services, including fire services and medical services. 
• Volunteers’ Utilization: Volunteers should be encouraged and trained to 
make up for shortage of dedicated emergency response workers. 
• Resource Allocation: Standing budget of National Disaster Management 
Agencies of Pakistan and Turkey should be increased gradually. As an 
initial target, it may be raised to .05% of the national budget as compared 
to the current allocation of .16% for FEMA. Similarly, provincial/state, 




Even if they are not the most catastrophic, natural disasters are, however, the most 
unpredictable incidents that can dramatically affect the life routines of people. Moreover, 
many countries have international treaties or conventions and particular domestic 
precautions that are quite effective to prevent potential human-made disasters, such as 
threats from weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, and biological threats from 
hostile countries. These measures are often effective because of the predictable patterns 
and controllable further steps of these kinds of disasters. Nonetheless, the issue becomes 
far more complicated when the agenda is an unpredictable incident like a natural disaster. 
Even worse, when the countries stay ignorant and poorly prepared, the post-disaster 
scenario becomes rather destructive and intolerable in terms of human life losses. 
In this research, we studied three different countries’ natural disaster-management 
systems at the national level. Two of them were Turkey and Pakistan, both of which had 
similar and novel systems adopted pursuant to UN conventions. The third one was the 
United States, which had a relatively mature and complex system in comparison to the 
other two. 
We started our research with the general facts and definitions coming from history 
and underlying almost all types of natural disasters. Subsequently, we introduced the 
evolutionary development of natural disaster-management systems of these three 
countries in light of historical facts regarding the organizational formations of their 
systems. 
The most salient finding we detected was the public awareness issue. All three 
countries suffered from destructive natural disasters in the recent past. While the United 
States had the ability to learn from the failures and history, the other two were slow to 
realize the urgency and importance of the same issue. Thus, this social ignorance and 
unawareness permeated the official handling of the disasters at the state level, and slowed 
down the establishment of strong disaster-management organizations in these two 
countries. 
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Throughout our analyses, we examined the structural and organizational 
differences among the national natural disaster-management agencies of these three 
countries. We observed that the organizational skeletons of the AFAD and NDMA were 
quite similar, because both Turkey and Pakistan modified their systems due to two 
common reasons. First, both experienced very destructive incidents such as the Marmara 
Earthquake of 1999 in Turkey, and the Kashmir Earthquake 2005 in Pakistan, showing 
that their disaster-management systems were significantly lacking in an effective 
response to those affected. Second, both countries’ state authorities decided to take 
immediate action to do internal performance assessments and establish more resilient 
disaster-management organizations. At that point, these countries chose to literally adopt 
a model that was mandated to them by the UN rather than create a hybrid model that 
would cover both the requirements peculiar to each, and the conventions mandated by the 
UN. In fact, our further studies showed that this normative condition was true of the 
United States, because FEMA is a unique organization that was able to meet the 
requirements of U.S. contingencies in terms of logistics, response, manning, managing, 
and inter-organizational development. 
After completing our research about the organizational structures of these three 
countries, we started to analyze the effectiveness of FEMA, AFAD, and NDMA in the 
cases of Hurricane Irene, the Van Earthquake, and the floods in 2010, respectively. In so 
doing, we researched how these organizations handled the response, and how effective 
they were in terms of a four-leg disaster-response cycle, consisting of preparedness, 
response, mitigation, and recovery. The outcomes of the case studies manifested that 
FEMA was sufficient and efficient enough to collect and reallocate resources to affected 
areas, and it successfully organized the local disaster-management organizations and 
NGOs to mitigate the post-disaster effects of hurricane. The only problem with FEMA 
was the flow time of the funds from the executive branch. For instance, while AFAD and 
NDMA served directly under the presidencies of Turkey and Pakistan, FEMA was under 
the lead of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, so this situation made FEMA 
vulnerable to inter-agency rivalry for the funds appropriated by the presidency and 
Congress. Thus, we deduced that decentralization could be a better way to attain effective 
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disaster response, because decentralization could help local authorities improve their own 
disaster-management organizations and emergency plans peculiar to them. However, 
centralization at the state level, in other words at the national level, would be beneficial 
for lead disaster-management organizations to demand extra or complementary funds 
from the presidency. 
In addition to the Hurricane Irene case as a point of comparison, we also noted 
critical problems in the responses of AFAD and NDMA. The Van Earthquake was the 
first real case for AFAD after its founding. Everything had seemed perfectly planned and 
coordinated before the incident, but the real-life scenario revealed that the preparations 
were only on the white papers and visual slides presented to governors. First, AFAD 
could not sustain an effective logistics and transportation network between affected and 
supporting locations. Second, it could not organize local organizations, and so most of the 
search and rescue efforts were indirectly assumed by military and international agencies. 
Finally, the response showed that plans were unrealistic and inapplicable for the Van 
region which is characterized by rough terrain with insufficient infrastructure. 
Surprisingly, the results of NDMA in the case of the floods of 2010 were quite similar. 
The NDMA also experienced various logistical problems due to the unexpected 
magnitude of the floods that deluged all main transportation routes to the affected areas. 
This was the clue suggesting insufficient planning in preparedness. Like the AFAD, the 
NDMA also had similar organizational problems in terms of effectiveness, manpower, 
and coordination of efforts. As a result, these valuable findings suggested that if a country 
wanted to successfully deal with natural disasters, it had to establish an agency whose 
organizational structure was not a mockery or coarse copy of other developed agencies 
that had the ability to meet the requirements of their home countries. 
Finally, we collected all our findings including the pros and cons of each agency 
in each particular case in order to articulate our relevant recommendations to the state 
authorities of the U.S., Turkey, and Pakistan. Our main concern was to show the readers 
that establishing an agency could not be the agenda of governments, because doing that 
would not warrant a successful organization; however, we intended to demonstrate that 
an agency had to have particular norms, values, and common sense in order to develop 
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into a successful and persevering organization that had the ability to deal with the 
problems, requirements, and changing state of the environment, life, and nature. 
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